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Introduction
Health care is a critical topic: to individuals who fear they may lose
it, to the public whose well-being depends upon it, and to policy makers
struggling to make it more affordable and accessible.' Health care is also
a critical subject for constitutional law. Although cases concerning
health care form a relatively small percentage of the Supreme Court's
total caseload, they often dominate public and scholarly discussion of the
Court. Issues such as abortion,' the right to die,' the treatment of se-
verely disabled newborns,4 the rights of those with infectious disease,5
1. The health care cost and access crises was a major issue in the 1992 presidential elec-
tion, Robin Toner, The 1992 Elections: The President-The Overvieir; Clinton Captures Presi-
dency with Huge Electoral Margin; Wins a Democratic Congress, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 1992, at
Al. The Clinton Administration has promised to propose a plan by May 3, 1993 that would
guarantee access to health care to all Americans and control health care costs. See Robert
Pear, Clinton Considers Stopping Medicaid Under Health Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 1993, at
Al, A12; see also Robert Pear, Insurers' Turnaround on Health Benefits Only Opens New Set of
Questions, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 1992, at D17.
2. See, eg., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992) (joint opinion of Jus-
tices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter) (discussing the sustained debate of the Court's abortion
cases and their impact on the Court's legitimacy). The public and political debate over abor-
tion is chronicled in LAURENCE TRIBE, ABORTION: THE CLASH OF ABSOLUTrES (1990). The
scholarly debate over the Court's abortion decisions is multitudinous. See infra note 7. A
complete bibliography would take several pages.
3. Although the Supreme Court did not decide a right-to-die case until 1990, Cruzan v.
Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 110 U.S. 261 (1990), judicial review of such issues has
received unprecedented attention ever since the New Jersey Supreme Court decided in 1976
that Karen Ann Quinlan had a "constitutional right to die." In re Quinian, 355 A.2d 647, 663
(N.J.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
4. See Bowen v. American Hosp. Ass'n, 476 U.S. 610 (1986). This issue received a great
deal of publicity in the mid-1980s when the Reagan Administration sought to issue regulations
that would require hospitals to treat severely disabled newborns despite parental opposition.
See id.
5. School Bd. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273 (1987) (analyzing the applicability of § 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 to an individual with tuberculosis). The major constitutional ques-
tions about the rights of individuals with infectious diseases, especially AIDS, have yet to be
decided by the Supreme Court, although many commentators have speculated about such is-
sues. See, e.g., Lawrence 0. Gostin, The Politics of AIDS Compulsory State Powers, Public
Health, and Civil Liberties, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 1017 (1989); Deborah J. Merritt, Communicable
Disease and Constitutional Law: Controlling AIDS, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 739 (1986); Wendy E.
Parmet, Legal Rights and Communicable Disease: AIDS, the Police Power, and Individual
Liberty, 14 J. HEALTH POL. PoL'Y & L. 741 (1989). There are, however, many lower court
decisions on point. E.g., Doe v. Coughlin, 518 N.E.2d 536 (N.Y. 1987) (state may constitution-
ally prohibit prisoners with AIDS from receiving conjugal visits), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 879
(1988); City of New York v. New St. Mark's Baths, 497 N.Y.S.2d 979 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 505
and the treatment of the mentally impaired 6 are inevitably the most ur-
gently anticipated of all the Court's cases. Not only do these cases grab
the headlines, they also influence the direction of larger doctrines and
play a paramount role in scholarly debates over the legitimacy of judicial
review and the proper methodology for constitutional interpretation.7
Despite the prevalence and prominence of health care issues in con-
stitutional discourse, the unique role those issues have played is usually
ignored by constitutional scholars.8 Health law scholars, meanwhile,
often do not ask what light these cases shed on the nature of constitu-
tional rights. This Article is one step in a journey aimed at asking those
N.Y.S.2d 1015 (N.Y. 1986) (upholding state authority to close gay bath). It is now likely that
much of the need for constitutional analysis of this subject will be met by decisions under the
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), Pub. L. No. 101-336, 42 U.S.C §§ 12101-
12213 (Supp. II 1990). Lawrence 0. Gostin, Public Health Powers" Imminence of Radical
Change, in THE AMERICANS wrrH DISABILITIES ACT: FROM POLICY TO PRACTICE 268, 269
(Jane West ed., 1991).
6. In the last 25 years, the Supreme Court has decided numerous cases concerning the
rights of the mentally ill and mentally retarded. See RALPH REISNER, LAW AND THE
MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM (1985).
7. It does not seem like hyperbole to suggest that no modem decision, other than Brown
v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955), has so affected constitutional analysis as has Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2800-01 (1992)
(joint opinion by Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter); Linda R. Hirshman, Bronte,
Bloom, and Boric An Essay on the Moral Education of Judges, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 177, 179
(1988). For examples of works that have used Roe as the starting point for a reexamination of
the judicial role, see MICHAEL J. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS AND HUMAN
RIGHTS 144 (1982); John H. Ely, The Wages of Crying Wol. A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82
YALE L.J., 920, 937-43 (1973); Richard A. Epstein, Substantive Due Process by any Other
Name: The Abortion Cases, 1973 Sup. CT. REv. 159, 161-75. Of course, the privacy doctrine
also concerns reproduction and sexuality. While it is undoubtedly true that Roe had as much
to do with these subjects (not to mention gender discrimination) as with health, it is worth
noting that the Roe Court emphasized that the right at issue was a right to treatment in consul-
tation with a doctor. 410 U.S. at 164.
Cases concerning the rights of the mentally ill have also been pivotal to the formation of
the procedural due process doctrine. See, e.g., Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113 (1990) (hold-
ing that unauthorized commitment to mental hospital can violate the commands of procedural
due process if commitment is foreseeable and a pre-deprivation remedy is practicable);
Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982) (the institutionalized mentally retarded have a
liberty interest in reasonably safe conditions of confinement, including freedom from unreason-
able bodily restraints); Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979) (requiring a "clear and con-
vincing" standard of proof in a civil commitment hearing).
8. Scholars focusing specifically on cases concerning rights of public health officers or
doctors usually discuss all of the above cases and search for judicial attitudes towards "health
care." See Scott Burris, Rationality Review and the Politics of Public Health, 34 VILL. L. REV.
933 passim (1989); Lawrence 0. Gostin, The Future of Public Health Law, 12 AM. J.L. &
MED. 461, 468-71, 476-90 (1986); Merritt, supra note 5, at 754-783. What such articles usu-
ally do not consider are what those attitudes say about constitutional law and the connection
between the constitutional rights enunciated in the cases and the policy debate over access to
care.
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questions9 and exploring the relationship between constitutional law and
the preservation of health.
The Article is predicated on the assumption that the constitutional
cases arising in the health care context raise some common issues,
whether those cases involve abortion or the rights of persons with AIDS.
At their core, all of these cases question the relationship between the
body politic and individuals who are facing the reality of physical vulner-
ability and, ultimately, biological mortality. These common issues high-
light the drama and poignancy of health care cases; they may also offer
some insight into the seemingly inordinate influence of these cases on
constitutional law.
I suggest these cases are so influential because the relationship be-
tween the vulnerable individual and the body politic is more fundamental
than we commonly assume. I argue that our constitutional heritage may
recognize this, permitting a vision in which the relationship between law
and health, the state and the individual, is more reciprocal, more elemen-
tal, than current doctrine or debate concedes.
In making these arguments, I limit my inquiry to an exploration of
the relationship between the individual and the body politic during the
colonial and framing eras. In so doing, I do not claim there can be a
single authoritative understanding of the subject during the relevant
times. Rather, I argue only that the experiences and theories of the fram-
ing generation did not assume a laissez faire or libertarian attitude about
health. The framing generation assumed that governments had a signifi-
cant role to play in protecting health and providing care to the ill. Per-
haps more importantly, the Framers may have seen that protection and
provision, authority and responsibility, were correlative: that govern-
ments were empowered to protect and, therefore, legitimate only when
they protected the public health.
To begin, I review in Part I the understanding that informs current
jurisprudence and has led me to this enterprise: that the Constitution
primarily limits the government's power to restrain individual freedom
without imposing affirmative obligations. Part II provides an introduc-
tion to the role that governments typically play with respect to health
and the theories that explain such roles. In Part III, I review the status
of public health law in the American colonies and during the confedera-
tion and early federalist eras. 10 In Part IV, I consider how the under-
9. For my earlier views on some related issues, see Parmet, supra note 5, passim.
10. This inquiry is limited to a review of public health practices that were believed to
affect physical, as opposed to mental health. The traditional treatment of mental health issues
was in many ways different, although there were some overlapping themes. For a discussion of
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standing of public health law in the framing era may have comported
with the political theories prevalent at the time, especially liberalism, re-
publicanism, and social contract theory. In that same section, I develop
the outlines of a constitutional theory-based on social contract analysis,
but compatible with other Eighteenth century theories-of the relation-
ship between the body politic and health. In Part V, I ask why there is a
dearth of explicit discussion of these views in the standard primary
source documents, and I explore the role that federalism may have
played in hiding the issue and misleading subsequent interpreters. In
Part VI, I conclude with speculations about how this reconceptualization
of constitutional assumptions can illuminate the issues we face today.
I. Conventional Assumptions
In the century that has witnessed Auschwitz and Chernobyl, it is
easy to see the dangers posed by state power. This recognition tempers
enthusiasm for public authority and leads us to use law as a limiting
device." In our legal tradition, this view of law is integral to constitu-
tional structure, with its emphasis on separation of powers, checks and
balances, procedural protections, and individual rights. We rely on the
Constitution to limit the power of the government to restrain our free-
doms and cause us harm.12 In this sense, law is a negative force that
prevents the state from intruding upon the individual.
This negative conception of law, which sees legal rights as a restraint
upon the state, has played a dominant role in the formulation of contem-
porary American public health law. It explains the central pillars of con-
stitutional public health law: the search for limits on governmental
authority to restrain individual freedoms in the name of public health,
and the concomitant assumption that government has no obligation to
promote public health.13
The search for limits on government's power to act to protect the
public's health is a vast topic that can only be briefly surveyed here. 4 In
the history of public policies towards mental health, see, e.g., GERALD N. GROB, MENTAL
INSTITUTIONS IN AMERICA: SOCIAL POLICY TO 1875 (1973); Joyce M. Ray & F.G. Gosling,
Historical Perspectives on the Treatment of Mental Illness in the United States, J. PSYCHIATRY
& L., Summer 1992, at 135.
11. See Frank I. Michelman, Possession vs. Distribution in the Constitutional Idea of Prop-
erty, 72 IowA L. Rv. 1319, 1345 (1987) (stating that law is the chaperon of distrust).
12. We also rely on law to protect our property. See id. at 1338.
13. I have explored these two sides of the same coin in greater detail in Parmet, supra note
5, at 754-62.
14. For a fuller treatment of the topic, see Burris, supra note 8, at 933-82; Parmet, supra
note 5, at 743-48.
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the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, governmental public health
authority fell under the rubric of the police power, which was considered
to be a plenary source of state authority. Public health actions lay within
the core of the police power. When states acted to protect public health,
the police power usually authorized their actions, limiting the reach of
other constitutional bars to state action, such as the Commerce Clause,"5
and later the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 6 In
this century, much of constitutional law has concerned limits on the po-
lice power in the name of individual rights. During the Warren and Bur-
ger Court eras, doctrines such as procedural due process,17 equal
protection,' and, privacy 9 were used by the courts to determine limits
15. Mayor of New York v. Miln, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 102, 109, 131-33 (1837). This is an
oversimplification. The Court's commerce clause doctrine changed frequently throughout the
19th century. Not all courts and not all justices assumed that the police power always immu-
nized state action. Chief Justice Marshall, for example, in Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9
Wheat.) 1, 207-08 (1824), suggested that a state police power action would be preempted if it
conflicted with a federal exercise of commerce authority. Thus, although Marshall saw the
police power as a legitimating source of state action, he recognized that an action taken by a
state in the name of public health could conceivably thwart a congressional commerce policy.
Id. at 208-09; see also Minnesota v. Barber, 136 U.S. 13 (1890) (holding health regulation may
be unconstitutional if it burdens interstate commerce).
16. Throughout the latter part of the 19th and early part of the 20th centuries, the Court
consistently stated that public health actions under the police power did not violate the Due
Process Clause. See Parmet, supra note 5, at 744. The central issue at the time was whether a
state action, ostensibly taken in the name of public health, actually was within the police power
or constituted, instead, unauthorized interference in social and economic affairs. See Dobbins
v. City of Los Angeles, 195 U.S. 223, 236 (1904). The Justices at the time disagreed about the
degree of deference due states in determining whether an action was reasonably taken to pro-
mote the public health, not whether states could protect public health. Compare Lochner v.
New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53-64 (1905) with id at 73 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
17. The procedural due process doctrine provides that where an individual interest in life,
liberty, or property is at stake, the state must provide procedural protections. Cleveland Bd. of
Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541 (1985). This doctrine has limited the authority of
states to commit individuals, see supra note 6, and to quarantine those with contagious dis-
eases, Greene v. Edwards, 263 S.E.2d 661, 663 (W. Va. 1980); Wendy E. Parmet, AIDS and
Quarantine: The Revival of an Archaic Doctrine, 14 HOFSTRA L. Rnv. 53, 77-81 (1985).
18. E.g., Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (equal protection prohibits the
forced sterilization of certain felons); District 27 Community Sch. Bd. v. Board of Educ., 502
N.Y.S.2d 325, 337 (Sup. Ct. 1986) (equal protection prohibits the exclusion of HIV-positive
children from the public schools).
19. Courts have used the privacy doctrine to prevent states from prohibiting or unduly
burdening abortions, Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992), from prohibiting
the sale of contraceptives, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,485 (1965), and from forcing
medical treatment on an unwilling patient, e.g., Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., 497
N.E.2d 626, 633 (Mass. 1986); In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 663 (N.J. 1976). In Cruzan v.
Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 110 U.S. 2841, 2851 (1990), the Supreme Court found
that a patient possessed a liberty interest in determining whether to continue medical treat-
ment. The majority, however, stopped far short of finding that the right to privacy placed any
clear substantive limits on state requirements. Id. at 2852-56.
[Vol. 20:267
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on state authority over matters once clearly assumed to be within the
police power, including questions relating to health. More recently, the
Court has given greater deference to legislative majorities. In the critical
area of abortion, for example, a plurality of the Court has rejected strict
scrutiny and opted to permit state regulations of abortion which do not
place an "undue burden" on a woman's choice.20 Four Justices have
voted to go even further and uphold any state regulation of abortion as
long as it is rational.21 Under such a formulation, states may well have
far greater leeway in regulating matters of health than they did prior to
the New Deal, when the concept of the police power served to limit state
action.22
Although the scope of individual protections is waning, current doc-
trine continues to assume that the sole function of constitutional law is to
place limits-not obligations-upon government.23 Chief Justice Rehn-
quist wrote in DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Serv-
ices that "[t]he [Due Process] Clause is phrased as a limitation on the
State's power to act."'24 In disparaging claims of a constitutional right to
emergency medical care, Judge Easterbrook of the Seventh Circuit has
been even more explicit. Discussing the Civil War Amendments, he
stated that,
Amendments designed to protect the people from the government,
to cut it down to size lest it repeat the excesses of George III and
the slave states, amendments adopted when governmental services
were more likely to be viewed as forbidden than as desirable,
amendments phrased as prohibitions on governmental action
rather than requirement of it, are not a plausible source of [rights
to emergency medical care].25
20. See Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2806-10 (rejecting imposition of ajudicial "straightjacket" on
state regulation of abortion).
21. Id. at 2855 (opinion by Rehnquist, C.J.).
22. Cf Burris, supra note 8, at 934-37. In the pre-New Deal era, courts determined
whether state actions were truly within the police power. Parmet, supra note 5, at 744. This
effectively imposed a reasonableness test on state public health actions. Burnis, supra note 8, at
934-37. The Rehnquist Court appears to be limiting the privacy/substantive due process doc-
trine without reinstating the earlier police power doctrine. The result is a strongly
majoritarian doctrine that effectively places few or no substantive counter-majoritarian limits
on state action. Parmet, supra note 5, at 761-62.
23. See Susan Bandes, The Negative Constitution: A Critique, 88 MICH. L. REv. 2271,
2273 (1990).
24. 489 U.S. 189, 195 (1989).
25. Archie v. City of Racine, 847 F.2d. 1211, 1221 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S.
1065 (1989). Although Judge Easterbrook, like Justice Rehnquist in DeShaney, was referring
to the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, his reference to George III in dis-
cussing a clause identical in language to the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment,
suggests that Judge Easterbrook would read the Bill of Rights, plus the Constitution of 1787,
Winter 1993]
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The implication, according to what Susan Bandes has aptly called the
"conventional wisdom, ' 26 is that government has no affirmative obliga-
tion to provide protections. As Justice Rehnquist continued in
DeShaney, the purpose of the Due Process Clause "was to protect the
people from the State, not to ensure that the State protected them from
each other. The Framers were content to leave the extent of governmen-
tal obligations in the latter area to the democratic political processes."'27
In the area of public health, the assertion that the Constitution im-
poses no affirmative obligations has had a critical impact. Fundamen-
tally, it implies that the government has no obligation to provide public
health protection,2" including access to medical care.29 Thus, in the
United States, the legal debate over access to medical care occurs within
the framework of subconstitutional privilege.3 0 The government has no
obligation to provide health care; whatever is provided is a matter of
statutory grace.
This conceptualization has several implications. It permits the cur-
rent state of affairs in which over thirty million Americans lack any
health insurance and over sixty million lack health insurance during
some portion of each year.31 It excludes from legal critique the severe
inadequacy of public health programs and the resulting rapid rise in re-
cent years of once-tamed communicable diseases, such as measles and
tuberculosis.32 Thus with respect to the re-emergent tuberculosis epi-
demic, the primary legal question appears to be whether the state can
detain individuals with active disease who fail to take their medication, 33
not whether the state has an obligation to ameliorate the problems of
as providing no rights to care and protection. For a discussion of the role played by the
Fourteenth Amendment, see infra text accompanying notes 432-38.
26. Bandes, supra note 23, at 2274.
27. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 196.
28. Thus, there is no obligation for the government to provide emergency ambulance ser-
vice. See Archie, 847 F.2d at 1220-22. Nor is there any governmental obligation to protect
citizens from dangerous schizophrenics. Bowers v. DeVito, 686 F.2d 616, 619 (7th Cir. 1982).
It, of course, follows that there is no obligation to provide children with immunizations or to
take other steps that protect the public's health.
29. Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759, 1776 (1991); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 318
(1980); Charles J. Dougherty, An Axiologyfor National Health Insurance, L. MED. & HEALTH
CARE, Spring-Summer 1992, at 82, 83 ; Parmet, supra note 5, at 754-57.
30. See Judith 0. Brown, Wendy E. Parmet & Phyllis T. Baumann, The Failure of Gender
Equality: An Essay in Constitutional Dissonance, 36 BuFF. L. REv. 573, 633, 639 (1987). Of
course, politicians and citizens often discuss "rights" to health care.
31. Emily Friedman, The Uninsured: From Dilemma to Crisis, 265 JAMA 2491 (1991).
32. National Vaccine Advisory Committee, The Measles Epidemic" The Problems Barri-
ers and Recommendations, 266 JAMA 1547, 1549-51 (1991); Lisa Belkin, Top TB Peril: Not
Taking The Medicine, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 18, 1991, at Bi.
33. Roric Sherman, TB Hysteria, Repeated?, NAT'L L.J., June 29, 1992, at 1, 32.
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homelessness, lack of access to health care, HIV infection, and substance
abuse that have fueled the epidemic. 34
The conventional assumption that government has no obligation to
provide health care has had other less-recognized impacts. Because gov-
ernment need not provide care and protection, the Supreme Court has
assumed that government may be selective in the benefits it provides. In
Harris v. McRae, 5 the Supreme Court held that because there was no
obligation on the part of government to provide medical care, Congress
was free to exclude medically necessary abortions from the Medicaid
program. The Court reached this result even though Medicaid paid
medical expenses associated with childbirth and, at the time the decision
was reached, freedom to have an abortion was considered a fundamental
right. Thus, in effect, the Court held that because the government need
not provide any health benefit, it can practice selective subsidization,
even when so doing effectively skews individual choices pertaining to fun-
damental rights.
The tension between the Constitution's limits on government intru-
sions upon individual liberty and the Constitution's lack of affirmative
obligations underlies the unconstitutional-conditions doctrine, which
deals with the fact that strings attached to statutory benefits can effec-
tively undermine otherwise recognized liberties.3 6 The dilemma most re-
cently surfaced in the health context in Rust v. Sullivan,37 in which the
Supreme Court upheld the right of the government to predicate Title X
family planning grants on the requirement that grantee clinics not dis-
cuss the abortion option with their clients, even if abortion is medically
advisable.38 In Rust, the government was able to use the "privilege" of
Title X grants to effectively "buy" the surrender of first amendment
rights of free speech. This surrender of rights was justified by the Court
on the assumption that Title X grants are mere gratuities, to which
neither grantee nor client has any right. Chief Justice Rehnquist stated:
By accepting Title X funds, a recipient voluntarily consents to any
restrictions placed on any matching funds or grant-related income.
Potential grant recipients can choose between accepting Title X
34. UNITED HOSPITAL FUND OF NEW YORK, THE TUBERCULOSIS REVIVAL: INDIVID-
UAL RIGHTS AND SOCIETAL OBLIGATIONS IN A TIME OF AIDS 5-6 (1992).
35. 448 U.S. 297, 318 (1980).
36. An extended discussion of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine is beyond the
scope of this Article. For a full analysis, see Seth F. Kreimer, Allocational Sanctions: The
Problem of Negative Rights in a Positive State, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1293 (1984); Kathleen M.
Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1415 (1989).
37. 111 S. Ct. 1759 (1991).
38. Id at 1773. The policy at issue in Rust was recently rescinded by President Clinton.
Memorandum of Jan. 22, 1993, The Title X "Gag Rule," 56 Fed. Reg. 7455 (Feb. 5, 1993).
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funds-subject to the Government's conditions.., or declining the
subsidy and financing their own unsubsidized program.39
The Chief Justice added, "The difficulty that a woman encounters when
a Title X project does not provide abortion counseling or referral leaves
her in no different position than she would have been if the government
had not enacted Title X. In other words, because the government has
no obligation to provide her with care, the woman is no worse off if the
care the government chooses to provide comes with a restriction on the
content of speech. The woman can always choose not to accept the deal
and would be left no worse off than she would be in the state of nature,
where no deal would be offered.41
The conventional wisdom, therefore, assumes that the constitutional
baseline is a laissez faire state of nature.42 Under this view, the funda-
mental relationship between individual and state embodied within the
Constitution assumes no prior obligations on the part of the state to pro-
vide health protection. The state is like a wealthy, but not always benev-
olent, uncle. It can choose to provide or not to provide public health
care. And if it chooses to provide care, the state can attach strings to the
"gift."'41 The result is not only that the government has no obligation to
provide care, but also that it can use its provision of care to "buy" itself
an exemption from otherwise existing constitutional restrictions.
39. 111 S. Ct. at 1775 n.5.
40. Id. at 1777.
41. Even if one accepts Chief Justice Rehnquist's premise that the woman had no "right"
to the service, his conclusion remains questionable. As Justice Blackmun noted in his dissent,
a Title X beneficiary may well be given an incomplete and even false impression of her medical
condition and the options available to her as a result of the regulations. Id. at 1785 (Black-
mun, J., dissenting). The idea that the rejection of Title X funds leaves the woman no worse
off than she would have been in the state of nature is completely erroneous, if not ludicrous. It
is hard to see a complex, regulated industrial society as akin to the state of nature. Wendy E.
Parmet & Mary E. O'Connell, Rehnquist's Road to Serfdom: The Ominous Message of Rust v.
Sullivan, Am. PROSPECT, Spring 1992, at 94, 96-97. As Bandes has pointed out, poverty and
joblessness, which leave a Title X recipient unable to afford non-subsidized care, are at least
partially the result of governmental policies. Bandes, supra note 23, at 2320-23 (describing
government's effect on the economy through regulation, control of scarce resources, taxation
policies, etc.). Moreover, access to health care is particularly influenced by government regu-
latory policies which influence the affordability of health care. Surgery Needed: Last of the Big
Spenders, THE ECONOMIST, July 6, 1991, at 9-11 (discussing how governmental policies are
responsible for the rapid rise of health care prices); Brown, Parmet & Baumann, supra note 30,
at 630 (discussing how Medicare and other government health programs have exacerbated the
difficulties the poor have in obtaining care); Parmet & O'Connell, supra, at 96-97.
42. Bandes, supra note 23, at 2343.
43. Parmet & O'Connell, supra note 41, at 96. Mary O'Connell has observed the telling
analogy between the unconstitutional conditions doctrine under the Rehnquist Court and the
law of spendthrift trusts, under which the grantor can set many restrictions on the beneficiary's
receipt of trust income and neither the beneficiary nor his or her creditors has standing to
complain.
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Given the importance of these assumptions to cases concerning pub-
lic health and the prominence of health cases within the unconstitu-
tional-conditions doctrine generally,' a critical question must be asked:
Are the underlying assumptions of the conventional view accurate? At
first glance, they appear to receive support from the text of the Constitu-
tion itself.45 After all, the document says nothing about the obligation of
government to provide public benefits, much less to protect the public
health.46 True to the views of conventional assumptions, many of the
constitutional provisions are phrased as injunctions against governmental
authority,47 or negative rights.48
Nevertheless, the leap from the text of the document to the conven-
tional assumptions is a large one. The Constitution itself is remarkably
silent about the relationship between individual and government. Nor
does it specify the relationship between the restraints on governmental
authority explicit in the document and the role of government assumed
by its creators. Thus, the Framers' actual understanding of the relation-
ship between individual and state with respect to health must be gleaned
from sources other than the text itself.
The balance of this Article explores other sources of interpretation,
primarily the public laws and political theory of the framing era. As I
argue, those sources suggest that the framing generation held a very dif-
ferent view of public health than the conventional assumptions assert. In
the framing generation, governments were expected to furnish disease
prevention programs and provisions to secure the public health because
the Framers believed that governmental authority was tied to the protec-
tion of health and safety.4 9
44. E.g., Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759 (1991); Harris v. McCrae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980);
Kathleen Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions and the Distribution of Liberty, 26 SAN DIEGO
L. REV. 327, 332-36 (1989).
45. Archie v. City of Racine, 847 F.2d 1211, 1220-22 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489
U.S. 1065 (1989); Bandes, supra note 23, at 2309-11 (discussing the textual argument in sup-
port of the proposition that the constitution creates no "positive rights").
46. Note, however, that the Constitution does provide the federal government with the
means to tax and spend "for the general welfare," an authority which appears to assume that
the welfare of the citizenry is at least a legitimate, if not obligatory, responsibility of the federal
government.
47. This is discussed at length in David P. Currie, Positive and Negative Constitutional
Rights, 53 U. CHm. L. Rnv. 864, (1986).
48. The term "negative rights" refers to rights against governmental interference which
presumably leave individuals free to pursue their own preferences. The primacy of negative
rights over positive rights, whereby government provides the content of freedom, was most
powerfully explicated by Isaiah Berlin in his influential essay Two Concepts of Liberty, in FouR
ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 118 (1970).
49. Even if the conventional assumptions do accurately reflect the originalist assumptions
of the drafters of the Philadelphia Convention, that does not settle the question whether those
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H. Health and Governments: Background Understandings
Current legal analysis assumes that the relationship between individ-
ual and state is primarily negative." The Constitution imposes no obli-
gation upon government to protect the public health. Instead, the
Constitution's role is to empower government while, at the same time,
limiting its ability to impinge upon individual interests. Under constitu-
tional theory, public goals play a role only indirectly in determining
whether governmental restraints upon individuals are justified by the
weight of the public interest at stake. Public goals do not form the basis
of public duties. Under this view, the dilemma for judicial review is how
to justify limits placed upon majoritarian policies for the protection of
individual rights."1
This conventional view presupposes that the role of law and legal
rights is to restrain governmental action. It also assumes that individual
liberty is prior to law. Whatever the general merit of this conceptualiza-
tion of rights and law, in the context of health care it overlooks two
fundamental facts. First, if liberty is prior to states, so is mortality. Dis-
ease, injury, and threats to health constrain freedom without the help of
any state, although states can surely exacerbate such dangers.5 2 Thus,
there is no ideal state of nature in which the only threat to freedom is the
one libertarians identify: aggression towards property. 3 Rather, any hy-
pothetical state of nature would have to include dangers and threats to
liberty posed by the inevitability of disease.54 Second, whatever the theo-
retical role of the law, it has always had to deal with the constraints
imposed by disease and mortality. Law has always had to respond to the
assumptions should bind us over two hundred years later. To assume that they do would be to
adopt a rather rigid originalist position, one that is controversial. Compare, eg., ROBERT H.
BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA (1990) with H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Under-
standing of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 885 (1985). In any event, an argument that
relies on original intent to deny affirmative obligations of state governments must also look to
the intentions of the drafters and ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment, a task that is often
overlooked. See Bandes, supra note 23, at 2312-13. Robin West, for example, makes the inter-
esting argument that protection by government was precisely the right contemplated by the
drafters of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. Robin West, Toward an
Abolitionist Interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment, 94 W. VA. L. REV. 142 (1991). The
following analysis focuses on the assumptions and understandings of the federalist generation,
not to provide an originalist answer to current dilemmas, but to question the conventional
assumptions underlying current jurisprudence.
50. See supra part I.
51. This has been the central issue for the scholarly debate about Roe v. Wade. See supra
note 7.
52. See infra text accompanying notes 56-58.
53. See RICHARD EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMI-
NENT DOMAIN 5 (1985).
54. See infra notes 310-51 and accompanying text.
constraints imposed by disease. Governments typically have assumed an
active role with respect to health care, acting as if their role were
obligatory.55
While disease is omnipresent and prior to social organization, com-
munal life can create special hazards. The effects of trade, urbanization,
and the consequent problems of sanitation and pollution show that while
the organization of society can reduce the dangers of disease, it can also
exacerbate them. This epidemiological phenomenon can be seen most
starkly in the colonization of the New World by Europeans. As is well
known, European settlement wrecked havoc on the native population by
exposing it to Old World diseases.56 What may be less well known is that
even within the white settlements of North America, it was urbanization
(without adequate sanitation) accompanied by international trade that
brought forth repeated epidemics of yellow fever and cholera
epidemics, 7 and, later, the enduring epidemic of tuberculosis.5"
The reality is that the dangers of ill health will always exist. Even in
the mid-twentieth century industrialized world, during the brief calm be-
tween the polio and AIDS epidemics when communicable disease
seemed anachronistic, threats such as carcinogens in air pollution59 sug-
gested that health risks are part and parcel of the human condition.
To the economist, efforts to combat these risks are at least partially
public goods." The benefits from public goods are indivisible among
beneficiaries. A sole private purchaser of health care would give others
55. See infra notes 66-266 and accompanying text.
56. WILLIAM McNEIL, PLAGUES AND PEOPLE 176-207 (1976).
57. CHARLES ROSENBERG, THE CHOLERA YEARS: THE UNITED STATES IN 1832, 1849,
AND 1866, at 17-39 (1964). Lack of clean drinking water and inadequate sewage disposal are
also cited as the major cause of the recent cholera outbreak in South America, the first cholera
epidemic in the Americas in nearly a century. The rapid growth and destructiveness of the
disease results from the large numbers of urban poor in Peru and Brazil. James Brooks, Chol-
era Kills 1000 in Peru, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 19, 1991, at A3.
58. JOHN B. BLAKE, PUBLIC HEALTH IN THE TOwN OF BOSTON 1630-1822, at 220
(1959); JOHN DUFFY, A HISTORY OF PUBLIC HEALTH IN NEW YORK CITY 1625-1866, at
457-58 (1968) [hereinafter DUFFY, NEW YORK].
59. I have suggested elsewhere that the decline of infectious diseases in the early part of
this century reduced perceptions of shared vulnerability and appreciation of the importance of
public health. Parmet, supra note 5, at 748.
60. ROBIN BRADWAY & NEIL BRUCE, WELFARE ECONOMICS 14, 118 (1984). Public
health may be considered a "mixed good" with aspects of both public and private goods. Mus-
grave and Musgrave, for example, cite polio vaccination as a classic example of a mixed good
for which public subsidization is the most efficient economic policy. RICHARD A. MUSORAVE
& PEGGY B. MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC FINANCE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 78-80 (1980). Rawls
cites communicable disease prevention as a prime example of a public good. JOHN RAWLS, A
THEORY OF JUSTICE 266-68 (1971).
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in society a "free ride" with respect to the benefits obtained. 61 For exam-
ple, one's vaccination protects another from infection. Conversely, the
costs of failing to pay for such goods may be reaped by others. If I have
active tuberculosis and fail to take my medication, you may become ill.
If I lack the resources to pay for my medication and neither you nor the
state help me to purchase it, you may also become ill. To market theo-
rists, such goods are legitimate objects of governmental intervention in
the market. As Amartya Sen has written, "The market can indeed be a
great ally of individual freedom in many fields, but the freedom to live
long without succumbing to preventable morbidity and mortality calls
for a broader class of social instruments." 62
While the theory of public goods helps explain aspects of public
health law and assists in fitting it into modem economic theory, 63 it
omits a critical point. Ill health is not a mere byproduct of economic
activity. It is an inevitable concomitant of human existence. As a result,
wherever there is human society, there will be public health. Every soci-
ety has to face the risks of disease. And because it must, every society
searches to make disease, like mortality, comprehensible within the con-
text of the society's own particular culture, theology, or science." In this
sense, health care is public not only because its benefits are indivisible
and threats to it arise from factors outside of the individual, but also
because communal life gives individuals the cultural context in which to
understand it.
Contemporary Americans who are used to thinking of illness as a
personal and private matter 65 are apt to forget that almost all societies
61. MUSGRAVE & MUSGRAVE, supra note 60, at 57-61; see also JOSHUA 1. SCHWARTZ,
PUBLIC HEALTH: CASE STUDIES ON THE ORIGINS OF GOVERNMENT RESPONSIBILITY FOR
HEALTH SERVICES IN THE UNITED STATES 124-25 (1977) (arguing that public health is an
analogue to the phenomenon of externalities).
62. Amartya Sen, Individual Freedom as a Social Commitment, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, June
14, 1990, at 49, 53.
63. The influence of this mode of analysis has been particularly significant in environmen-
tal law, see, e.g., FREDERICK R. ANDERSON ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION LAW
AND POLICY 19-51 (2d ed. 1990), but could be used more broadly to justify many activities of
the modern welfare state. Robert E. Goodin, Reasons for Welfare, Sociological and Political-
But Ultimately Moral, in RESPONSIBILIrY, RIGHTS AND THE WELFARE STATE 24-26 (Donald
Moon ed., 1988).
64. See SUSAN SONTAG, ILLNESS AS METAPHOR (1978), for a discussion of how disease
obtains social meaning within the context of a particular culture.
65. I have discussed elsewhere the transformation of the perception of illness from a pub-
lic matter to a private one. See Parmet, supra note 5, at 750-52; see also Deborah A. Stone,
The Resistible Rise of Preventive Medicine, 11 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 671 (1986). Per-
haps the recent reemergence of national health insurance as a political issue signals a decline in
seeing health as a private matter. See, eg., How Wofford Rode Health Care to Washington,
WASH. POST NAT'L WKLY. EDITION, Dec. 1, 1991, at 14-15.
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have public policies for the control and alleviation of disease. All socie-
ties must come to terms with illness. They seek to do so in the ways
understood by their society: strengthening community bonds and their
statehood in the process.
Throughout history, the need to deal with disease has been an ac-
cepted role of civil society. As legal scholar James Tobey said over sixty
years ago, "The protection and promotion of the public health has long
been recognized as the responsibility of the sovereign power. Govern-
ment is, in fact, organized for the express purpose, among others, of con-
serving the public health and can not divest itself of this important
duty." 66
How governments have fulfilled that duty has varied throughout
time and across societies, affected always by the wealth, scientific sophis-
tication, and fundamental values of the culture.67 Because health is de-
fined in part by a community's belief system, public health measures
reflect cultural norms. In highly religious societies, the preservation and
regulation of health is intermingled with theological considerations.
Heavenly appeal is sought in time of plague.68 In Puritan New England,
for example, fear of disease was met with official days of prayer and fast-
ing.69 In our more secular era, governments rely on less theistic ap-
proaches, such as investment in medical research.7'
Throughout history, governments have performed their public
health role by providing care for the indigent and by taking steps to pre-
vent the spread of epidemics. Although many of the steps taken were not
efficacious71 and the care provided may even have been harmful given the
poor quality of medical knowledge,72 states acted in the only way they
could, relying on the practices and theories of the day to protect the pub-
lic health. The Hellenic city-states had public physicians who were paid
from the public coffers and likely treated the indigent, as well as serving
66. James A. Tobey, Public Health and the Police Power, 4 N.Y.U. L. REv. 126 (1927).
67. MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE; A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND EQUAL-
rry 87 (1983).
68. See Parmet, supra note 5, at 747-48.
69. BLAKE, supra note 58, at 3-6; see also Acts of Massachusetts Bay Colony, Jan. 3, 1677;
May 8, 1678; Oct. 15, 1679; reprinted in 3 THE LAWS AND LIBERTIES OF MASSACHUSETTS
1641-1691, at 525, 529, 545 (John D. Cushing ed., 1976) [hereinafter LAWS AND LIBERTIES OF
MASSACHUSETTS].
70. For an example of a secular approach, see REPORT OF THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMIS-
SION ON THE HUMAN IMMUNODEFICIENCY VIRUS EPIDEMIC passim (1988).
71. For example, isolation of individuals may have done little to stem plague. See Parmet,
supra note 17, at 56 n.16. Indeed, it may have exacerbated the problem. ANNE CARMICHAEL,
PLAGUE AND THE POOR IN RENAISSANCE FLORENCE 130 (1986).
72. For a discussion of the poor state of medical knowledge and the limited benefits of
medical care prior to recent times, see McNEIL, supra note 56, at 208-12.
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all, in times of plague.73 The Romans built aqueducts and sewers and
regulated food and sanitation.74 Medieval Jewish communities estab-
lished hospitals and paid communal midwives and physicians."
During the late Medieval and Renaissance eras, many European
states developed complex laws to prevent and treat communicable dis-
eases, especially plague.7 6 Italian city-states enacted detailed systems of
mercantile quarantines, while individuals stricken, especially the poor,
were isolated and treated in the listeria.77 In Calvinist Geneva, the City
Council ran the famous hospital, which cared for the sick and poor.7"
In England, the nation with which our own Framers would have
been most familiar, the government's role to protect public health was
long established in both theory and practice.79 Long before the Ameri-
can revolution, English political theorists recognized the need for a gov-
ernment role in health protection. To Hobbes, life without government
was one of "continual fear, and danger of violent death; and the life of
man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short."8 0 To the more sanguine
Locke, people unite "for their mutual Preservation of their Lives, Liber-
ties and Estates.""1 These theoretical statements fit comfortably with ac-
tual public health practices in England. 2
Although urbanization and sophisticated systems of public health
probably appeared later in England than in Italy, ordinances designed to
abate nuisances in England date back to 1350.83 Recognition of the dan-
73. WALZER, supra note 67, at 69.
74. JOHN DUFFY, THE SANITARIANS: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN PUBLIC HEALTH 6
(1990) [hereinafter DuFFY, SANrrARANS].
75. WALZER, supra note 67, at 73.
76. Of course, non-European societies also developed methods to respond to disease. My
focus here is limited to Western societies, which would have been the greatest influence on our
own Framers.
77. CARMICHAEL, supra note 71, at 108-26.
78. JEANNINE E. OLSON, CALVIN AND SOCIAL WELFARE, DEACONS AND THE BouRSE
FRANCAISE 24-25 (1989). City and church were in many ways inseparable in Geneva. While
some health care functions, such as maintenance of the hospital, were carried out by formally
civic authorities, many others were carried out by the church deacons. Id. at 25-30. Officials
of the municipal hospital, however, also partook of the title "deacon." Id. at 30. Olson points
out that in general Protestant states relied more upon secular authorities to care for the sick
and poor while Catholic states relied more upon the church. Id. at 2.
79. See infra text accompanying notes 80-101.
80. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 100 (Michael Oakeshott ed., 1962) (discussing the war
of all against all in the absence of civil authority).
81. JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT § 123, reprinted in Two
TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 368 (Peter Laslett ed., 2d ed. 1967).
82. See infra text accompanying notes 83-97.
83. BLAKE, supra note 58, at 11. Nuisance law has long been closely associated with
public health law. BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE LAW IN AMERICA 45-46 (1974). At common
law, a public nuisance was that which interfered with the rights of the community-at-large. W.
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ger of unsanitary conditions also came surprisingly early."4 In the fif-
teenth century, the royal government established a commission on
sewerage.85 Henry VII forbade slaughterhouses in cities or towns "leste
it might engender sickness." 6
As elsewhere, fear of plague was an early impetus for the establish-
ment of English public health laws. In 1518, a royal proclamation was
issued to control those "contagious infections" which were "likely to
continue if remedy by the sufferance of Almighty God was not pro-
vided.""7 The proclamation, devised by Cardinal Woolsey for London,
required contagion houses to be identified by marking them with straw
for forty days 8 and inmates of plague houses to carry white sticks when
walking the streets.8 9 Enforcement of the proclamation was left to the
justices of the peace.9°
Between 1544 and 1577, hospitals were established by London's
leaders to provide for the diseased and disabled as well as foundling chil-
dren and "idle rogues."'" In 1578, the Privy Council issued its first book
of Plague Orders, prepared with the cooperation of the College of Physi-
cians.92 The orders, directed to the justices of the peace, contained a
typical feature of early public health laws: they intermingled prevention
and restrictions of freedom with care and protections. They required the
PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON LAW OF TORTS 643 (5th ed. 1989). Those
rights have long included rights to public health and safety. Id. at 643-44 (listing cases).
Statutory and bureaucratic police power responses could be seen as simply paralleling the
common law view that there can be no individual right in property when property endangers
others. Cf Commonwealth v. Alger, 61 Mass. (7 Cush.) 53, 84-85 (1851) ("We think it is a
settled principle, growing out of the nature of well-ordered civil society, that every holder of
property, however absolute and unqualified may be his title, holds it under the implied liability
that his use of it may be so regulated, that it shall not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of
others.").
84. Sewage disposal was provided for in Europe as early as the 14th century. Privies,
cesspools, and public latrines existed, even though they were far from adequate and did not
replace open street sewers. In addition, town ordinances provided construction requirements
for cesspools and privies such as mandatory distances between the cesspools and neighboring
houses. However, even though the contents of privies (except household urinals) were prohib-
ited from draining into street sewers, public disregard for the ordinances was common and was
more to blame for unsanitary conditions than was inadequate technology. BARBARA W.
TUCHMAN, A DISTANT MIRROR: THE CALAMITOUS 14TH CENTURY 107 (1978).
85. BLAKE, supra note 58, at 11.
86. Id at 11-12.
87. PAUL SLACK, THE IMPACT OF PLAGUE IN TUDOR AND STUART ENGLAND 20 (1985)
[hereinafter SLACK, IMPACT].
88. Forty days was the traditional quarantine term for plague in medieval Europe. Mc-
NEIL, supra note 56, at 151 (1976).
89. SLACK, IMPACT, supra note 87, at 201.
90. Id
91. PAUL SLACK, THE ENGLISH POOR LAW 1531-1782, at 16 (1990).
92. SLACK, IMPACT, supra note 87, at 209.
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justices to meet every three weeks to receive updates on plague infections,
to assess general taxes for the provision of care to plague victims, and to
quarantine93 victims and their families for up to six weeks. 94 The orders
were codified in 1604 and made perpetual in 1641. 9" Although Parlia-
ment modified the regulations continually throughout the seventeenth
century,96 it consistently provided for isolation and the provision of care
for the infected, especially the indigent.97
Those actions taken to protect public health did not likely derive
from feelings of altruism toward the poor or ill. The laws providing med-
ical care were related to the poor laws, which are not remembered for
their compassion.98 Rather, far stronger motivations such as fear and
necessity may have spurred seventeenth and eighteenth century public
health regulations and may explain why such laws were not seen as mere
"gratuities" which could be easily repealed.
Health laws went to the heart of the governmental role. Referring
to England's complex system of plague regulations, Blackstone stated
that they were "of the highest importance." 99 More fundamentally, in
describing the "rights and liberties" recognized by the laws of England,
Blackstone declared that: "The rights of personal security consist in a
person's legal and uninterrupted enjoyment of his life, limbs, his body,
his health, and his reputation.""l°° He included as among an English-
man's rights "[t]he preservation of a man's health from such practices as
may prejudice or annoy it."' 01 Thus, preservation of the public's health
93. In modem public health parlance, quarantine refers to the prophylactic detention of
an individual who is not yet symptomatic but is suspected of carrying a communicable disease.
The Anglo-American legal tradition, however, has typically also used the term to refer to the
enforced isolation of individuals ill with an infectious disease as well as the forced detention of
goods suspected of harboring sources of contagion.
94. SLACK, IMPACr, supra note 87, at 210.
95. Id at 211.
96. Id at 211-23.
97. For example, in 1625 Parliament passed orders doubling the poor rate in London in
order to benefit plague victims, and enacted a general collection to finance plague charity. Id
at 216.
98. According to Paul Slack, the poor laws took their inspiration both from traditional
views about charity, as well as from humanist beliefs in the possibility of reform, especially
moral reform, through public intervention. SLACK, supra note 91, at 14-15, 49. Thus, the
poor law repeatedly distinguished between the idle and able-bodied poor, who were to be pun-
ished or reformed, and the worthy poor, who were given cash relief. Id at 15-18. Conse-
quently, while the laws had their charitable and reformist roots, they can also be seen as
punitive in intent, at least to some of the poor.
99. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSToNE, COMMENTARIES *161.
100. lid at *125.
101. 1 id at *130.
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was essential and traditional to the law's role. It was upon this under-
standing that colonial practices developed.
I. Public Health Practices in the Colonial and
Federalist Periods
In considering views about government's role with respect to health
care in the colonial and federalist eras, the social and political institutions
of the time must be kept in mind. Today when we imagine "activist
public health," we conceive of large standing bureaucracies, usually lo-
cated somewhere within the 1-495 Beltway in Washington, D.C. Criti-
cizing the United States for not providing health care to all of its citizens,
critics assume that the provision of health care refers to insurance cover-
age for the costs of medical expenses. By those standards, pre-constitu-
tional America lacked any significant conception of public health law.
Nevertheless, it would be a fallacy to assume that the absence of
institutionalized bureaucracy or of established legal entitlements during
the eighteenth century precluded states from playing an active role in the
protection of health. Nor would it be correct to conclude that the pro-
tection of health during that era was considered a matter of private, as
opposed to public, responsibility. Indeed, in comparison to the general
paucity of bureaucratic organization in pre-industrial America, the vast
extent of health regulation and provision stands out as remarkable.10 2
The public role in the protection and regulation of eighteenth cen-
tury health was carried out in ways quite different from those of today.
Organizations responsible for health regulation were less stable than
modem bureaucracies. 103 They tended to appear in crises and wither
away in periods of calm.1 4 The focus was on epidemics which were seen
as unnatural and warranting a response, not to the many endemic and
chronic conditions which were accepted as part and parcel of colonial
life."05 Not surprisingly, religious influence was significant, especially in
the seventeenth century. 106 Additionally, in an era which lacked sharp
demarcations between private bodies and governmental establishments,
many public responsibilities were carried out by what we would now con-
102. Health regulation and provision was most notable in the New England and the Mid-
Atlantic colonies. See infra part III.A-B.
103. DupFY, SANrrARIANs, supra note 74, at 25, 35-50; DuFFY, NEw YORK, supra note
58, at xvii.
104. DUFFY, NEW YORK, supra note 58, at xvii.
105. DuFpy, SANrrARiANs, supra note 74, at 2. It should be noted, however, that there
was a significant amount of sanitary regulations, which protected the public from endemic as
well as epidemic conditions. See infra text accompanying notes 154-67.
106. SCHWARTZ, supra note 61, at 92 (1977); BLAKE, supra note 58, at 21-25.
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sider private associations. 7 Nevertheless, the extent of public health
regulation long before the dawn of the welfare state is remarkable and
suggests that the founding generation's assumptions about the relation-
ship between government and health were more complex than is com-
monly assumed.108 I examine these issues by looking at practices in New
England, the mid-Atlantic states, and, finally, the South." 9
A. Public Health Laws in Colonial New England
Public responsibility for the prevention of disease and the care of the
ill was rooted most firmly in the New England colonies and especially in
the Massachusetts Bay Colony. Puritan theology stressed God's role in
all earthly occurrences.'"' Disease was seen as God's chastisement for
sin.' Sieges of illness were viewed as evidence that God's "[a]nger
[had] not yet turned away from us, appearing as in other respects, so also
in a signal manner in the contagious spreading Disease of the Small Pox,
and other Distempters." 2 In response to such "[c]ommissions to the
destroying Angel,"113 the General Court of Massachusetts Bay Colony 14
would invariably proclaim days of fasting, prayer, and humiliation. 5
Theology sometimes impeded what today we would consider rea-
sonable public health actions. Health, like almost everything else in Pu-
ritan society, was intermingled with religious belief. That the belief
systems of the era attributed different etiologies to disease than we do
today does not, however, negate the fact that there was public responsi-
bility for health. After all, it is no more surprising that the Puritans
relied upon theology to explain disease and suggest responses than it is
that we rely upon medical science. The important point is that despite
their faith, public authorities provided civil responses which assumed
preventative and palliative roles.
107. Daniel Fox, The Politics of Physician's Responsibility in Epidemics: A Note on History,
18 HASTINGS CTR. RPT. 5-10 (1988) (Special Supplement: AIDS: The Responsibilities of
Health Professionals); see also SCHWARTZ, supra note 61, at 118-124 (arguing that public
health follows from private organizational responses).
108. See supra notes 26-49 and accompanying text.
109. See infra text part III.A-C.
110. BLAKE, supra note 58, at 3.
111. Id
112. Act of May 8, 1678, 3 LAWS AND LIBERTIES OF MASSACHUSETTS, supra note 69, at
529.
113. Act of Oct. 15, 1679, 3 LAWS AND LIBERTIES OF MASSACHUSETTS, supra note 69, at
545.
114. The General Court was the Colony's legislature.
115. BLAKE, supra note 58, at 3-4.
These public responses went beyond prayer. Puritan theology as-
sumed that God acted not only through natural causes but through the
"secondary causes" of man."1 6 Early New Englanders saw no inconsis-
tency in using prayer, medicine,"' 7 and law in attempting to preserve
health."1 8 To Puritan New Englanders, the social covenant through
which earthly governments received their authority was established to
enforce God's laws. 19 Moral law obliged people to live within a society
which aimed for the good of all its members. 120 The welfare of each was
not irrelevant, but it was subordinate to the welfare of the whole. 2 ' And
law provided for the general welfare.
This earthly jurisprudence is evident in the colony's early public
health policy. As far back as 1629, the General Court of Massachusetts
Bay Colony acted to protect the public health by limiting the number of
passengers on each ship carrying migrants to the new colony. 122 In 1647,
when the General Court learned of epidemics in the West Indies, it or-
dered a quarantine of all ships arriving from those ports. 123 That order
began a pattern of maritime quarantines in response to threats of
epidemics. The General Court attempted to codify the practice in 1699,
but the English Privy Council rejected the measure as too harsh.1 24 In
116. BLAKE, supra note 58, at 5-6; see also Perry Miller, The Puritans, in PURITANISM IN
SEVENTEENTH CENTURY MASSACHUSETTS 10-11 (David Hall ed., 1968) (discussing how,
despite their belief in divine causation, the Puritans endeavored to understand, within the lim-
its of human capacities, the logic and reason of events).
117. Medical care in the New England colonies came primarily from physicians who had
accompanied the settlers from England. BLAKE, supra note 58, at 6. These doctors, relying on
the accumulated experience which they brought with them, id. at 10, attributed disease and
epidemics to geographic and meteorological conditions. JOHN DUFFY, EPIDEMICS IN COLO-
NIAL AMERICA 5 (1953) [hereinafter DUFFY, EPIDEMICS]. Disease was thought to come from
miasma, a noxious gas emanating from filth, putrefying vegetation, or from the bowels of the
earth. DUFFY, THE SANrrARIANS, supra note 74, at 4. In addition, sweating, purging, and
bleeding were common remedies used to alleviate sickness and disease. Id. at 5. Furthermore,
few colonial doctors were medical school graduates. Id at 7. Because the economy of colonial
America could not support many medical schools or hospitals, BLAKE, supra note 58, at 8,
medical education was relegated to the apprenticeship system.
118. BLAKE, supra note 58, at 36.
119. Edmund S. Morgan, The Puritan Dilemma: The Story of John Winthrop, in Hall,
supra note 116, at 44-45, 47-48.
120. Bernard Bailyn, The New England Merchants in the Seventeenth Century, in Hall,
supra note 116, at 86.
121. Id.
122. Id.; BLAKE, supra note 58, at 1.
123. BLAKE, supra note 58, at 18; see also DONALD R. HOPKINS, PRINCES AND PEASANTS,
SMALLPOX IN HISTORY 238 (1983).
124. An Act for the Better Preventing of the Spreading of Infectious Sickness, 1 ACTs AND
RESOLVES OF THE PROVINCE OF MASSACHUSETTS BAY ch. 7, at 376-77 (1699-1700); BLAKE,
supra note 58, at 32.
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1701, legislation was finally enacted. 125
The quarantine legislation was a blueprint for the era. Relying on
the assumption that certain illnesses were contagious, the statute aimed
at preventing epidemics by restraining the social contacts of infectious
individuals or goods. The legislation not only called for the quarantine
of potentially infectious ships, it also empowered local selectmen to re-
move to a separate house or isolate anyone with plague, smallpox, or
other "pestilential or malignant fever[s]."'126 As was evident in the Eng-
lish laws and earlier informal local practice, 127 the statute did not merely
restrain the freedom of those stricken. It also authorized selectmen to
provide for the care of the ill by impressing housing, nurses, or whatever
was necessary.
128
The quarantine policies established by the 1701 law were carried out
and modified throughout the colonial period. 129 The law was followed in
the smallpox epidemic of 1702.130 In 1717, a pesthouse hospital was
built with public money on Spectacle Island in Boston Harbor.' By the
1720s, the Massachusetts quarantine system had become regularized. 132
Some public health historians feel that this system may have helped to
reduce the incidence of disease in New England. 133
The interconnection between restraint and provision was also appar-
ent in the colony's approach to inoculation. The story of the spread of
inoculation in New England is a fascinating one.'34 The idea of inoculat-
ing individuals who had never contracted smallpox with smallpox pus, so
that they would contract a relatively mild form of the illness and thereby
gain resistance to a severe episode, was introduced to the colonies in 1716
by the Puritan theologian Cotton Mather.135 Mather, who first learned
of the practice from a slave and later read about it in the Transactions of
the Royal Philosophical Society,' 3 6 called a consultation of physicians to
125. An Act Providing In Case of Sickness, 1 ACm AND RESOLVES OF THE PROVINCE OF
MASSACHUSETTS BAY ch. 9, at 469-70 (1701).
126. Id.; BLAKE, supra note 58, at 33.
127. In the 1690s, for example, selectmen in Salem were active in providing care and provi-
sions for the sick. DuFFY, EPIDEMICS, supra note 117, at 48.
128. BLAKE, supra note 58, at 34.
129. Indeed, a contemporary Massachusetts statute follows the basic outline by permitting
selectman to isolate and care for the contagious. See MASS. GEN. L. ch. 111, § 95 (1988).
130. BLAKE, supra note 58, at 34.
131. Id. at 35.
132. Id. at 36.
133. Id. at 109-13.
134. The story is told in OLA E. WINSLOW, A DESTROYING ANGEL: THE CONQUEST OF
SMALLPOX IN COLONIAL MASSACHUSETTS (1974).
135. Id at 37.
136. Id. at 32-37.
Winter 1993] HEALTH CARE AND THE CONSTITUTION 289
consider inoculation.'37 Most physicians were opposed, but one, Zabdiel
Boylston, began to inoculate patients.'38 As word of Boylston's practice
spread, the Boston selectmen and the justices of the peace warned him
not to continue the inoculations. 139 Several ministers, including Increase
and Cotton Mather, then published a signed letter in the newspaper sup-
porting Boylston and the practice of inoculation.'" A furious pamphlet
war ensued as Boylston disregarded the selectmen's warnings and contin-
ued to use inoculation in his practice. 141
In response, the selectmen enacted the first of many regulations re-
specting inoculation. The ordinance did not prohibit the act, but regu-
lated it, requiring the inoculated to be sent to pesthouses or isolated in
their homes during the course of their outbreak.'42 This regulation was
not foolish: although inoculated individuals tended to develop mild
forms of the disease, they had active cases and were capable of spreading
the virulent form.143 During the next half century, as the popularity of
inoculation grew, the selectmen and the General Court gave inoculation
their frequent attention. Regulations of inoculation were often accompa-
nied by provisions for free inoculation of the poor. By 1764, the city of
Boston was actively involved in providing free inoculations and follow-
up care for the poor." With the aid of local physicians who agreed to
inoculate the poor free of charge, almost 5000 Bostonians were inocu-
lated during the epidemic of 1764.141 Poor inhabitants received treat-
ment either gratis from physicians or with the support of the municipal
overseers of the poor." By the end of the 1764 epidemic, almost every-
137. Id. at 46-47.
138. BLAKE, supra note 58, at 56-57; see also WINSLoW, supra note 134, at 48.
139. BLAKE, supra note 58, at 57.
140. Id
141. Id. at 58.
142. Id. at 60.
143. There is significant debate as to whether inoculation aided or exacerbated colonial
epidemics. Compare BLAKE, supra note 58, at 115 with id at 113-14 (while inoculation may
have benefited those who could obtain it, it may have had an overall effect of spreading the
disease). Unlike the later vaccination with cowpox virus, see infra text accompanying notes
170-73, the inoculation practiced in the early 18th century used live smallpox virus. Because
those inoculated had mild forms of the illness, they often did not consider themselves sick and
did not confine themselves to their homes. Instead, they went about spreading the disease.
BLAKE, supra note 58, at 113. As a result, the regulation, aimed at confining those who were
inoculated, actually constituted sound public health policy.
144. Id at 94, 116.
145. Id at 94.
146. Id. Blake states that 1025 poor persons were treated, but he is unclear as to how
many of these were provided with inoculations and how many were treated for natural epi-
sodes of the disease. Id. at 94.
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one had acquired some form of immunity to the disease. 47
As the public health historian John Blake has noted, Boston's regu-
lation of smallpox inoculation implicitly expressed the principle that gov-
ernment has a role to play in protecting the health of the public. 148 As
with the quarantine regulations, that role invariably contained both regu-
latory and care-providing aspects. In the case of smallpox, the two were
almost inseparable. Although many of the well-to-do who could afford
private inoculations displayed little concern for their less wealthy neigh-
bors, 4 9 public officials understood implicitly the public nature of conta-
gious disease. Unless inoculation was monitored and made available to
all, it would actually spread the disease and pose a greater harm to the
public's health. 50 In the face of a casually contagious disease such as
smallpox, only inclusive public policies could actually benefit the public
health. 151
The public role in protecting health was also reflected in the wide
range of public health regulations in colonial Massachusetts. Although
governmental activity was quite limited as compared to our own era,'52
the colonial public bodies were extremely active in regulating and provid-
ing for the public health.' 3 For example, public sanitation regulations in
Massachusetts go back as far as 1634, when Boston authorities ordered
that "[n]o person shall leave any fish or garbage near the said Bridge or
common landing place between the two creeks whereby any annoyance
may come to the people that pass that way.... ,5 4 Laws regulating the
147. Id.
148. Ido at 115.
149. Id at 108.
150. See supra note 143.
151. This was particularly apparent with smallpox, which was one of the only diseases
whose contagious nature was clearly understood before the development of the germ theory in
the 19th century. Because smallpox was so easily transmissible, it placed all at risk. The
bioethicist John Arras has referred to diseases such as smallpox as "democratic epidemics."
John Arras, The Fragile Web of Responsibility: AIDS and the Duty to Treat, 18 HASTINGS
CTR. RPT. 10-20 (1988) (Special Supplement: AIDS: The Responsibilities of Health Profes-
sionals); see also Parmet, supra note 5, at 746-47. This does not mean that the rich were not
better off. They always were. In the case of smallpox, they were able to afford private inocula-
tion and treatment. In addition, throughout the colonial period, they frequently were able to
leave areas facing epidemics. BLAKE, supra note 58, at 113. However, with a disease such as
smallpox that was particularly likely to affect small children, there was no way that anyone
could insure that his or her own family was fully safe, unless the community at large was safe.
152. This fact has caused one historian to suggest that colonial Massachusetts resembled
the classical economist's dream laissez faire state. ROBERT ZEMSKY, MERCHANTS, FARMERS
AND RIVER GODS: AN ESSAY ON EIGHTEENTH CENTuRY AMERICAN POLITICS 8 (1971).
153. Indeed, even Zemsky, who sees colonial Massachusetts as a laissez faire state, con-
cedes that the General Court raised and appropriated funds for localities "[o]nly in times of
genuine calamity, usually caused by an outbreak of smallpox." Id at 7.
154. BLAKE, supra note 58, at 13.
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quality of bread date from 1646,155 and those aimed at preventing fires go
back as far as 1679.156
The middle of the seventeenth century witnessed the rapid growth
of public health regulation. In 1649, the legislature regulated the prac-
tice of medicine "[florasmuch as the Law of God allows no man to im-
pair the Life or Limbs, of any Person, but in a judicial way. 1 57
Furthermore, in an era when filth was believed to be the cause of much
disease, 15' the General Court enacted legislation aimed at preventing the
pollution of Boston Harbor. 59 In 1666, Boston appointed a public scav-
enger to keep the streets free of live and dead animals." 6 In 1684,
slaughterhouses, seen as a source of filth and thereby disease, 161 were
regulated. 162
By the eighteenth century, public health regulations had become a
common feature of colonial life. These regulations were completely in-
termeshed with a mercantilist society's regulation of trade.1 63 For exam-
ple, the distillation of rum through lead was forbidden, probably to
protect the rum trade as well as to protect the public's health. 1" After
the Revolution, the sale of unwholesome food was forbidden.1 65 Sanita-
155. THE GENERAL LAWS OF THE MASSACHUSETTS COLONY (1647), reprinted in 1 LAWS
AND LIBERTIES OF MASSACHUSETTS, supra note 69, at 9.
156. Act of Oct. 15, 1679, reprinted in 3 LAWS AND LIBERTIES OF MASSACHUSETTS supra
note 69, at 547.
157. THE GENERAL LAWS OF THE MASSACHUSETTS COLONY (1649), reprinted in 1 LAWS
AND LIBERTIES OF MASSACHUSETTS, supra note 69, at 87-88; WINSLOW, supra note 134, at 3.
158. BLAKE, supra note 58, at 101-03; DUFFY, THE SANrrARIANS, supra note 74, at 20-22.
159. COLONIAL LAWS OF MASSACHUSETTS ch. 9, § 1 (1676); W.G. SMILLE, PUBLIC
HEALTH ADMINISTRATION IN THE UNITED STATES 11 (1940).
160. DUFFY, SANITARIANS, supra note 74, at 13.
161. The early regulation of slaughterhouses casts an interesting light on the famous
Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1872). The municipal regulation at issue, which confined
the practice of butchering to certain parts of New Orleans, is commonly seen today as an
example of economic protectionism. The question before the Court was whether the newly
enacted Fourteenth Amendment protected individual butchers' rights to engage in their pro-
fession against the regulatory claim of the state. Id. at 60. In fact, the history of public health
regulation shows that the practice of butchering was traditionally regulated in accordance with
public health policies. What was new in the 1870s was not the regulation of slaughterhouses,
but the laissez faire assertion that the right to engage in a trade provided the right to do so in
an unregulated manner.
162. BLAKE, supra note 58, at 29.
163. DUFFY, SANITARIANS, supra note 74, at 33 (noting that many early public health laws
were probably designed to protect trade as well as health). For a discussion of the influence of
mercantilism on the framing generation's thought and practice, see FOREST McDONALD,
NovUs ORDO SECLORUM: THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION 18 (1985).
164. DUFFY, SANITARIANS, supra note 74, at 33.
165. ACTS AND RESOLVES OF MASSACHUSETTS ch. 50 (1784). Blake suggests that un-
wholesome food was regulated even earlier, although the penalty was raised after the Revolu-
tion. BLAKE, supra note 58, at 145-46. I have not been able to find clear statutory evidence of
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tion became an increasing concern. In 1786, Boston appointed salaried
inspectors to police the sanitation of the streets. 166 Although the system
never worked well, the public authorities continued to focus on sanita-
tion with increased effort after the yellow fever epidemic of 1795.
In the early years of the Republic, long before the sanitary and pro-
gressive movements of the late 1800s, the General Court had chartered a
public aqueduct corporation to supply fresh water to the city of Bos-
ton,167 and had enacted legislation providing for a standing board of
health for Boston 6 ' and health powers for other local officials. Once
again the statutory scheme interwove regulation and protection. A stat-
ute of 1797 authorized selectmen to
take care and make effectual provision in the best way they can, for
the preservation of the inhabitants, by removing such sick or in-
fected person or persons, and placing him or them in a separate
house or houses, and by providing nurses, attendance, and other
assistance and necessaries for them; which . . . shall be at the
charge of the parties themselves, their parents or masters (if able)
or otherwise at the charge of the town or place whereto they be-
long: and in case such person or persons are not inhabitants of any
town or place within the State, then at the charge of the
Commonwealth.' 69
Once Edward Jenner's new smallpox vaccine was introduced into
the Commonwealth,170 the General Court enacted a law requiring every
town lacking a board of health to appoint a vaccination commission, ef-
fectively providing at least partial public subsidy for the vaccination of
all inhabitants.' 7 ' Although the success of this mandate was questiona-
ble, 1 72 thousands were vaccinated and the incidence of smallpox contin-
ued to decline.' 73 Moreover, the public bodies of Massachusetts had
shown once again the necessity of public health regulation and the rela-
tionship between limits on freedom and provision of care.
pre-Revolutionary regulation of unwholesomeness, although clearly the quality of bread was
long regulated. See supra note 155.
166. BLAKE, supra note 58, at 148-49.
167. Id. at 156.
168. AcTs AND REsOLVES OF MASSACHUSETTS ch. 47 (1789); BLAKE, supra note 58, at
167.
169. ACTS AND RESOLVES OF MAssACHuSETS ch. 16 (1797).
170. The vaccine was introduced into the United States in 1800 and was in use in Boston at
least by 1802. BLAKE, supra note 58, at 179-81. For a discussion of Jenner's discovery of the
vaccine and its introduction in Massachusetts, see WINSLOW, supra note 134, at 94-111.
171. LAWS OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS ch. 116 (1809-12); BLAKE,
supra note 58, at 186-87.
172. BLAKE, supra note 58, at 187.
173. Id. at 190-91.
B. New York and the Mid-Atlantic Colonies
The pervasiveness of public health regulation and provision in colo-
nial Massachusetts was unique among the colonies. The pattern of such
laws, however, was not unique. Quarantines were features of most port
towns.174 By 1700, almost every large town provided health care for the
poor. 175 Regulation and provision of care was commonplace. The story
of public health law in New York is illustrative.
As in New England, public health regulation in colonial New York
was not the province of professionals or bureaucrats. It was ad hoc, dis-
organized, and often reactive to the threats facing the colony. Only as
the population grew and the need intensified 176 did structure emerge. 177
Nevertheless, responsibility predated organization. As in Massachusetts,
it was often intermingled with mercantile trade regulations.'78 Yet, it
was part and parcel of the colonial landscape. The protection of health
and the provision of care were simply assumed to be responsibilities of
local and provincial governments. 179
The early years of the European settlements of what became New
York saw few public health or sanitary problems. The small population,
combined with a favorable climate and harbor, kept public health
problems to a minimum.180 When epidemics did arrive, officials usually
reacted. In response to a smallpox threat in 1622, authorities of the Eng-
lish settlement at East Hampton, Long Island instituted what might have
been the earliest recorded local quarantine of individuals in the European
colonies in North America.' 81
Extensive public health regulations in the New Amsterdam settle-
ment, later to become New York City, date back to the 1650s. Although
the Dutch West India Company did not provide for the care of the sick
or poor,'8 2 a small hospital had been built by 1658.183 That same year
also saw the first of many attempts to regulate privies. 184 Butchering and
174. DuFmY, SANITARIANS, supra note 74, at 24-6.
175. Id. at 31.
176. Duffy, for example, notes that public health problems intensify in direct, if not geo-
metric, proportion to population density. DuFnY, NEW YoRK, supra note 58, at XIX.
177. DuFFY, SANITARIANS, supra note 74, at 37-50.
178. SCHWARTZ, supra note 61, at 75; see also supra note 163.
179. DuFFY, NEW YORK, supra note 58, at XVII; SCHWARTZ, supra note 61, at 77.
180. DuFFY, NEW YORK, supra note 58, at 6-7.
181. HoPKrNs, supra note 123, at 239.
182. DuFFY, NEW YORK, supra note 58, at 9.
183. Id. at 9-10.
184. Id. at 18.
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fire regulations were also among the earliest of public health laws. '
After England conquered the Dutch colony in 1664, public health
regulations increasingly resembled the British and New England pattern.
Governmental authority to regulate for the preservation of health was
assumed. Activities that were seen as affecting the public health, such as
the practice of medicine 8 6 or the provision of public-drinking water, 187
were subject to legal control. When necessary, individual freedom of
movement was restricted by quarantine regulations.' Inoculation,
thought to be a hazard to public health, was banned in New York City in
1747, although enforcement was difficult.18 9
As in New England, these restrictive measures were merely one side
of a coin whose other side consisted of prevention and provision. In-
habitants of the colony benefited, at least theoretically, 190 from the dis-
ease prevention brought by the restrictions. Those who became ill and
suffered the further deprivations wrought by nature and restrictive laws
received care, even when they could not afford it on their own. By the
late 1680s, the city of New York not only paid the salary of a physician
for the poor,' 9' it also frequently appropriated funds to pay private phy-
sicians for similar efforts.1 92 Although their care differed in comfort, if
not in quality, 93 from that given to those who could pay, individuals
who were quarantined were inevitably provided with care.' 94
185. Id. at 12-15. Duffy also notes that there were extensive regulations of flour, grains,
and meat, but that these regulations were designed more to ensure quality than to protect the
health of the consuming public. Id. at 10, 12-14.
186. Id. at 33.
187. Id. at 30.
188. Id. at 60-62. New York's pesthouse at Bedlow's Island was built in 1760. Id. at 61.
New York's first provincial maritime quarantine law was enacted in 1755. 3 NEw YORK
COLONIAL LAWS ch. 973 (1755).
189. DUFFY, NEW YORK, supra note 58, at 56.
190. See supra text accompanying note 72 and infra note 193.
191. DUFFY, NEW YORK, supra note 58, at 34.
192. Id. at 67.
193. The medical care provided during that era was of such poor quality, however, that it is
difficult to say if anyone actually benefited from medical treatment. It might well be said that
those who had less access to care suffered less physically, than those "privileged" to afford
such treatments as extensive bleeding. See J.H. POWELL, BRING OUT YOUR DEAD, THE
GREAT PLAGUE OF YELLOW FEVER IN PHILADELPHIA IN 1793, at 130-32 (1949) (discussing
how the medical cures of Dr. Benjamin Rush may well have caused fatalities). Nevertheless,
such comments are obviously anachronistic and not useful for assessing the attitudes toward
public health care held during the colonial era. It is clear that at the time, people felt that care,
whether from physicians or from any of the other caregivers, was often useful.
194. DUFFY, NEW YORK, supra note 58, at 70. In discussing public health in early post-
Revolutionary Philadelphia, Hawke makes the point that while the poor received care, they
were not cared for in the comfort of their own homes as were the well-to-do. DAVID FREE-
MAN HAWKE, BENJAMIN RUSH: REVOLUTIONARY GADFLY 520-21 (1971). Indeed, as the
This regulatory pattern was augmented in the eighteenth century by
an increasing concern with sanitation. Although seventeenth century
physicians understood that smallpox was contagious, the etiology of yel-
low fever and other diseases remained unknown. As the seventeenth cen-
tury progressed, scientists increasingly disputed whether epidemics or
"pestilential fevers" could be attributed to contagious contacts or the pu-
trefaction of organic matter, known as miasma. 195 While this debate be-
tween the "contagionists" and "sanitarians" was quite fierce and lasted
into the nineteenth century, 196 historians have noted that public officials
followed a pragmatic and politically safe policy: they tended to pursue
both contagionist and sanitary policies. 197 While quarantine laws and
isolation requirements were kept in place, sanitary laws were strength-
ened. After a prominent member of the Governor's Council reported
that yellow fever resulted from "slimy wet grounds" and inadequate sew-
erage, the Provincial Assembly responded by passing a comprehensive
sanitary act prohibiting certain noxious trades from working in parts of
the city and placing restrictions on the disposal of waste. 19' In that same
year of 1744, the Common Council passed a sweeping sanitary ordinance
which increased the fines for violations of the sanitary laws and divided
the fines collected between private prosecutors and provision for the
poor.199 The sanitary movement continued in 1774 when money was ap-
propriated to build a public reservoir."co That project, however, was de-
railed by the outbreak of the Revolution.20 '
The years following the Revolution saw an increase in some types of
public health regulation despite the gradual rejection of mercantilism.
The first influences of laissez faire20 2 led in the 1780s to the relaxation of
historian Charles Rosenberg has extensively documented, hospitals were but extensions of
almshouses and primarily provided care for the indigent until at least the mid-19th century.
See CHARLES ROSENBERG, THE CARE OF STRANGERS, THE RISE OF AMERICA'S HOSPITAL
SYSTEM 15-121 (1987).
195. DuFFY, NEW YORK, supra note 58, at 41. For a discussion of the dispute between
contagionists and "localists" during the Philadelphia epidemic of 1793, see Martin S. Pernick,
Politics, Parties, and Pestilence: Epidemic Yellow Fever in Philadelphia and the Rise of the First
Party System, in SICKNESS AND HEALTH IN AMERICA: READINGS IN THE HISTORY OF
MEDICINE AND PUBLIC HEALTH 241, 242-45 (Judith Walzer Leavitt & Ronald L. Numbers
eds., 2d ed. 1985).
196. See ROSENBERG, supra note 57, at 75 (noting that by the 1830s most physicians be-
lieved cholera was not contagious).
197. See PERNICK, supra note 195, at 245.
198. DuFFY, NEw YORK, supra note 58, at 42-44.
199. kd at 45.
200. Id. at 49-50.
201. Id. at 50.
202. Adam Smith's The Wealth of Nations was imported to the American colonies in 1789.
ADAM SMITH AND THE WEALTH OF NATIONS, 1776-1976 BICENTENNIAL ESSAYS 1 (Fred R.
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older mercantile regulations affecting trades such as butchering and bak-
ing.20 3 At the same time, the post-Revolutionary era saw renewed civic
attention to the problems of health and sanitation.2' In 1784, the colo-
nial quarantine laws were officially reenacted by the state of New
York.20 5 A new and stringent medical licensing law was enacted.' 6 In
1790, the New York City Dispensary was established with private and
public monies to provide free medical care for the poor.20 7 Public money
also helped support private institutions which provided vaccinations for
the poor in the early years of the nineteenth century.20"
The yellow fever epidemics of the 1790s greatly influenced public
health policies in the mid-Atlantic states and led to more structured and
vigilant approaches.2 'o New York City responded to the crisis by isolat-
ing the ill210 and enacting sanitation orders.2 1 In 1796, New York State
enacted comprehensive health legislation which created the New York
City Health Office, granted the city authority to enact sanitary ordi-
nances, and further developed the city's quarantine system.212 When an-
other major epidemic struck in 1798, the city council appointed a special
health committee with almost unlimited powers.213 Care for the ill and
provision for the poor were among the committee's major objectives.21 4
During the 1798 epidemic, New York City spent $11,600 and the state
spent $45,000.215 A report following the epidemic urged that the city be
given even more authority to inspect buildings, enforce sanitation, and
plan for a fresh water supply. The report stressed that the public good
had to take precedence over any individual inconveniences that might
occur.216 Following receipt of the report, the city council drafted and the
state legislature enacted legislation authorizing the appointment of street
commissioners to carry out all laws for "the cleansing of the City and
Gelahel ed., 1978). Its laissez faire ideology met with a receptive audience among the new
commercial and entrepreneurial classes. See MCDONALD, supra note 163, at 128.
203. See DUFFY, NEW YORK, supra note 58, at 85-86.
204. Id. at 78-79.
205. IM. at 86.
206. Id. at 89.
207. Id at 89.
208. DuFrY, SANrrARIANS, supra note 74, at 55.
209. Id. at 48, 52-53.
210. Du-Y, NEw YORK, supra note 58, at 102.
211. Id at 106-07.
212. DuFrY, SANrrARIANS, supra note 74, at 42-43.
213. Id at 43.
214. DuF Y, NEw YoRx, supra note 58, at 108.
215. Dupry, SANrrARIANs, supra note 74, at 44.
216. Id
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promoting the Health thereof." '217
New York's response to the yellow fever epidemic can be contrasted
with Philadelphia's response to the calamitous yellow fever epidemic of
1793. Public health regulation was less firmly entrenched in Philadelphia
than in New York and the New England states. Throughout the eight-
eenth century, fewer measures were taken in Philadelphia than elsewhere
to prevent the spread of smallpox and inoculation was not regulated.18
Although the city had quarantine laws and a port physician, sufficient
money was not appropriated to ensure compliance with the proce-
dures.21 Perhaps as a result, smallpox ravaged the city repeatedly.220
Given that history, it was not surprising that disaster ensued when yel-
low fever struck in 1793. Many municipal officials fled the city.221 For a
time, civil authority effectively broke down.222
The legislature initially responded to the crisis by reenacting the
quarantine laws and granting the Governor extraordinary powers.223
When official response proved inadequate, however, as public officials
either died or fled, Mayor Matthew Clarkson hastily convened a special
civic committee of citizen volunteers with himself as president. 224 It was
given extraordinary authority to control the situation. 2 5 The committee
commandeered a vacant estate to establish a hospital and orphanage.226
It distributed food, firewood, clothing, and medicine.227 It buried the
dead and cleaned up the city.228 Without any understanding of the trans-
mission of yellow fever, however, the committee's efforts proved ineffec-
tive. Before the epidemic was over, some ten to fifteen percent of the
population had died of the disease.229
The story of the 1793 epidemic raises several key points about public
health regulation during the colonial and early federal periods. First, as
was universally evident throughout the period, the response to disease
217. Id.; Act of Mar. 30, 1798, THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK ch. 65 (1798).
218. BLAKE, supra note 58, at 111-12.
219. DumFY, SANrrARIANS, supra note 74, at 39.
220. Id.
221. Id. These municipal officials were not alone. Pernick estimates that some 20,000 Phi-
ladelphians fled the city, Pernick, supra note 195, at 241, which at that time was also the
federal capital. Many federal officials also panicked and left. See POWELL, supra note 193, at
110-19.
222. BLAKE, supra note 58, at 152.
223. POWELL, supra note 193, at 71.
224. Id. at 151-54.
225. DuFFy, SANrrARiANs, supra note 74, at 39.
226. Pernick, supra note 195, at 241.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id
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was ad hoc.2 30 There was no standing bureaucracy. As was common, a
citizen's committee performed much of the work.2 31
This lack of organized structure, however, was not an expression of
laissez faire ideology. Although the Mayor of Philadelphia eventually
called upon a citizen's committee to help the city through the epidemic,
the authorities did not assume the epidemic to be a matter of private
responsibility. In fact, in the beginning of the crisis, the Governor prom-
ised public funding and the municipal Guardians of the Poor took re-
sponsibility for the establishment of a poor hospital.2 32 The citizens
committee took over only after civil authority had prove inadequate.2 33
Moreover, the committee, with the mayor at its helm, clearly acted as a
public body wielding de facto public authority.2 34
The inhabitants of federalist Philadelphia, like others facing
epidemics during this period, never questioned whether government
should exercise extraordinary authority in response to the epidemic. The
debate was over the nature of the response. Positions depended upon
views of the etiology of the disease as well as politics. Contagionists, who
were most often Federalists, favored quarantine and the closing of the
port, which just coincidentally would have helped keep out the French
refugees from the Haitian revolution.2 35 Sanitarians, also known as lo-
calists, were most often Jeffersonian Republicans. Not surprisingly, they
favored sanitary reform and keeping the port open to the French.236 But
almost everyone agreed on the need for some public response.237 In fact,
a year after the epidemic, a standing board of public health was finally
established to prevent the type of crisis that had occurred.238
The practice actually followed in Philadelphia paralleled the pattern
evident in New England and New York. Extraordinary authority was
230. See supra text accompanying notes 103-04.
231. Schwartz argues that volunteer committees often constituted the first stage of public
health organization. SCHWARTZ, supra note 61, at 118-23. Only when population and indus-
trialization increased to the point where the problems were too complex for ad hoc commit-
tees, did government bureaucracies arise. Id at 73-74. Fox makes the more subtle point that
in the pre-industrial age government authority was often exercised through negotiation and
cooperation with private physicians and citizen groups. Fox, supra note 107, at 6-7.
232. POWELL, supra note 193, at 56-57.
233. Id. at 151.
234. Id at 152-53.
235. Pernick, supra note 195, at 242-44.
236. Id
237. The exception may have been Thomas Jefferson, who saw the silver lining in the epi-
demic. Years after, he expressed with approval the view that "yellow fever will discourage the
growth of great cities in our nation." Id at 245. He seems to have practiced what he
preached. He fled Philadelphia during the epidemic. POWELL, supra note 193, at 249.
238. Tobey, supra note 66, at 128.
wielded, although ultimately through unusual channels. Individual
rights of property and movement were subordinated.239 At the same
time, care was provided, especially to the growing numbers of poor.2'
Once again, the forfeiture of liberty was tied to protection and provision.
The exercise of governmental authority was connected to public
obligation.
C. Public Health in the South
In the South, public health was less developed during the colonial
period than it was in New England and the mid-Atlantic states.241 Sev-
eral factors seem to have contributed to the relative paucity of public
health regulations. One, undoubtedly, was the rural character of the re-
gion.242 As has been noted above, public health is integrally related to
urbanization and population density, which makes it obvious that public
health measures such as sanitation are public goods.243 In a rural envi-
ronment, a community's interdependency and mutual vulnerability with
respect to disease is less obvious.
The second unique feature of Southern life was the pervasiveness of
slavery. Although slaveholders had a private self-interest in maintaining
to some degree the health of their slaves, attitudes toward public health
likely differed in a society in which a large part of the population was not
239. For example, the privately owned Bush Hill mansion was impressed by the Guardians
of the Poor to serve as a hospital for the poor. POWELL, supra note 193, at 64-66.
240. IdL at 63, 258-64. This is not to say that the care was adequate or helpful. It was not.
Id. at 73-74. It was this very breakdown of the government's ability to fulfill its responsibility
in the face of the severe epidemic that made the Philadelphia experience so calamitous.
241. There is far more literature on the development of public health in the South in the
mid to late 18th century, a period which saw first resistance to and then gradual development
of sanitary reform. See James 0. Breeden, Disease as a Factor in Southern Distinctiveness, in
DISEASE AND DISTINCTIVENESS IN THE AMERICAN SOUTH (rodd Savitt & James H. Young
eds., 1988); John H. Ellis, Businessmen and Public Health in the Urban South During the
Nineteenth Century: New Orleans, Memphis, and Atlanta, 44 BULL. HIST. MED. 197 (1970).
There is also a considerable body of literature pertaining to the health of African-Americans
enslaved in the South. See, eg., Richard H. Steckel, A Peculiar Population: The Nutrition,
Health, and Mortality of American Slaves from Childhood to Maturity, 46 J. ECON. HIST. 721
(1986).
242. John Duffy, The Impact of Malaria on the South, in DISEASE AND DISTINCTIVENESS
IN THE AMERICAN SoUTH 44 (Todd Savitt & James H. Young, eds., 1988).
243. See supra text accompanying notes 60-63. This is not to say that the South lacked
public health problems. Indeed, while the region appeared to be extremely healthful in the
early years of European colonization, it quickly became known for its high incidence of dis-
ease, especially malaria and yellow fever. See Duffy, supra note 242, at 34. Breeden argues
that the widespread presence of disease contributed to the image of Southern backwardness.
Breeden, supra note 241, at 8.
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considered to be citizens,244 but rather property. 245 In a slave-maintain-
ing society, the health of the population enslaved was less a matter of
public responsibility than of the slaveowner's self-interest. Given the
economic and social organization of the ante-bellum South, it is not sur-
prising that government assistance for the poor and ill was less common
than in other parts of the country.2 4 6
Despite these distinctions, governments in the pre-Revolutionary
South were assumed to possess, and did exercise, public health authority.
For example, in 1620 the Privy Council ordered that guest houses be
built in Virginia for care of the sick.247 Towns paid local physicians to
care for the poor.248
One of the earliest recorded cases of individuals being isolated for
purposes of disease prevention occurred in West Hampton County, Vir-
ginia in 1667, where a colonel, acting as public health officer, issued a
proclamation warning all families infected with smallpox not to go out
until thirty days after their infection.249 In 1698, a maritime quarantine
was instituted in Charleston.25 Another law of the same year required
charterers of vessels to care for sick or injured seamen.2 1 By the mid-
244. Of course, there were slaves held and racism rampant in other parts of the country.
The extensive reliance on slavery and the slave economy, however, distinguished the South and
made the caste distinctions between individuals far more obvious and central to the region's
social organization.
245. It is possible that public health strategies are most effectively implemented in societies
that are at least partially egalitarian and democratic, where the common nature of the threat
can be perceived, and where individual classes cannot escape the problem at the expense of
other classes. Blake, for example, argues that Philadelphia's relatively ineffective public health
strategies, as compared with those used in New England, resulted from the less democratic and
more class stratified nature of Philadelphia society. BLAKE, supra note 58, at 110-12. I have
argued elsewhere that in heterogeneous and divisive societies, public health policies may read-
ily be misused to scapegoat minority groups. See Parmet, supra note 5, at 748-49.
246. DUFFY, SANrrARIANS, supra note 74, at 32; Richard H. Shryock, Medical Practice in
the Old South, 29 S. ATLANTIC Q. 176-77 (1930). This point was made in 1798 in congres-
sional debates over a proposed act to provide health care to seamen. Representative Sewall
from Massachusetts noted in Congress that in New England all of the sick were provided for,
but that sailors traveling to the South faced a problem, since such states did not always provide
relief. 8 ANNALS OF CONG. 1386 (1798).
247. DUFFY, SANITARIANS, supra note 74, at 16. There is no evidence that the houses were
actually built.
248. Id. at 24-25.
249. DUFFY, EPIDEMICS, supra note 117, at 102.
250. JOSEPH WARING, A HISTORY OF MEDICINE IN SOUTH CAROLINA 1670-1825, at 13
(1964) (An Act for the Raising of a Publick Store of Powder for the Defense of this Province
(1698)).
251. Ia at 18 (An Additional Act for the Poor; Preventing as much as may be the spread-
ing of Contagious Distempers (1698)).
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nineteenth century, quarantines were widely employed in most port
cities.252
The history of public health laws in Charleston, one of the South's
largest urban areas, provides insight into the region's views and practices.
Legislation attempting to prevent disease and provide care was common-
place.25 3 Public authority over sanitation dates back to 1704 when a law
regulating slaughterhouses and privies was prefaced by the statement
that "[tlhe air is greatly infected and many maladies and other intolera-
ble diseases daily happen.' 254 An act to build a pesthouse was passed in
1707255 and an act to provide medical care for the poor in 1712.256
Throughout the eighteenth century, the South Carolina legislature was
continually revisiting the question of provision for the poor, but despite
repeated legislation, the inadequacy of the care was widely recognized.257
By the late eighteenth century, inoculation was also regulated in
Charleston 258 and most Southern states, although to less effect than in
New England.2 59 An important example is Virginia's 1760 law imposing
severe penalties upon any person who imported any "various or infec-
tious matter" for the purpose of inoculating against smallpox while also
creating a strict licensing regime for administering inoculations. 26° The
law was amended in 1777261 to replace the licensing scheme with one
which permitted greater access to inoculation but required strict quaran-
tining during the procedure.2 62 It also provided that the state would pay
the expenses of anyone who could not afford the procedure.263 Some
governments went further, conducting mass inoculations.2 6
252. David R. Goldfield, The Business of Health Planning: Disease Prevention in the Old
South, 42 J.S. HIsT. 557, 562 (1976).
253. WARING, supra note 250, at 13-110.
254. DusFY, SANrrARiANS, supra note 74, at 16.
255. WARING, supra note 250, at 23 (An Act for Raising a Publick Store of Powder for
Defense of this Province (1707)).
256. I at 25-26 (An Act for the Better Relief of the Poor (1712)). The Act raised the
property tax to provide care and directed that the vestrymen pay for the medical care of the
poor.
257. See WARING, supra note 250, at 37, 49, 78.
258. Id. at 43, 76-77. Charleston's first inoculation regulation appears to have been en-
acted in 1738. It forbade inoculation outright. Id at 43. In 1768, the colony had granted the
Governor authority to waive the prohibition in individual cases. Id at 78.
259. DuFFY, EPIDEMICS, supra note 117, at 40.
260. Bill Concerning Inoculation for Small Pox (Dec. 27, 1777), reprinted in 2 THE PA-
PERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, at 122-24 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1950).
261. This bill may have been drafted by Thomas Jefferson. Id.
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. DuFFY, EPIDEMICS, supra note 117, at 34. Duffy reports that Charleston conducted a
mass inoculation of whites and blacks in 1738.
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The history of colonial and early federal public health in the South
is sketchy and somewhat atypical. Public health regulation appears to
have been less extensive there than elsewhere. Provision for the poor was
made only inconsistently. The reforms and centralization that followed
the yellow fever epidemics of the 1790s did not occur throughout the
region.265 The regulations that did exist, however, demonstrate that
there was little doubt about the government's authority to provide public
health protection, even though the continual need to do so may have
been less clearly appreciated in a largely rural environment. Moreover,
the relationship between public health and the provision of care was es-
tablished less firmly in a society skewed by the slave system.266
IV. Public Health Law and the Political Theory of
the Framers
What is the significance of the colonial and early federalist public
health laws? What do they say about the era's understanding of the role
of public health and the individual's relationship to the state with respect
to health? At a minimum, the pervasiveness of public health regulation
suggests that the populace saw no significant problem with government
exercising public health authority. 67 Nor did they see any fundamental
problem with provision of health care to the poor. 68 Thus, at least with
respect to public health, the Framers did not come from a laissez faire
265. DuFFY, SrrAIANS, supra note 74, at 46.
266. The effect of slave ideology on southern public health should not be underestimated.
In the early part of the 19th century, for example, southern physicians, eager to defend the
powerful slave-owning class, developed epidemiological theories to justify slavery and the dis-
tinctiveness of southern medicine. Southern physicians argued that African-Americans were
biologically distinct from whites, suffered from different diseases, and therefore required south-
ern-trained physicians. John Duffy, A Note on Ante-Bellum Southern Nationalism and Medi-
cal Practice, 34 J.S. HIsT. 266, 269-71 (1968). Such theories undoubtedly not only reflected
the racism and increasing separatism of the region, but also served, either intentionally or
unintentionally, to discredit northern critics of the slave system. They also had the effect of
isolating the South medically and discouraging southern practitioners from receiving their edu-
cation at northern medical schools. Id. at 273.
267. Of course, it is possible that the Framers believed in a political theory radically at
odds with their own actual experience. Thus, they could have preferred a laissez faire state
even if that was not one with which they were familiar. In fact, however, as is discussed below,
there is significant reason to believe that the Framers sought a constitution that would pre-
serve, rather than alter, the conditions then existing between individual and state. Daniel W.
Howe, The Political Psychology of The Federalist, 44 WM. & MARY Q. 485, 506 (1987).
268. Redistribution in general was an object of controversy during the constitutional era.
See JENNIFER NEDELSKY, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE LIMrrs OF AMERICAN CONSTITU-
TIONALISM: THE MADISONIAN FRAMEWORK AND rrs LEGACY 30-31 (1990). Madison, in
particular, was vehement in his opposition to redistributive laws. Id.; Frank I. Michelman,
Possession vs. Distribution in the Constitutional Idea of Property, 72 IOWA L. REV. 1319, 1331
(1987). Nevertheless, it seems clear that even he accepted that certain regulations or limits on
[Vol. 20:267
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world and they would have had no reason to assume that a minimal state
was the norm. This suggests that the Framers might not have shared the
libertarian assumptions underlying current constitutional doctrine.26 9
The question remains, however, whether the Framers merely toler-
ated an active role for government in the protection of public health, or
whether they went further and actually assumed that government was
somehow obliged to fulfill such a role. In other words, did the Framers,
like Justice Rehnquist,270 see public health care and protection as a mere
privilege which government can, but need not, provide. Or did they see
it as some type of government obligation?27
The answer cannot be definitively stated. The participants of the
Constitutional Convention left little evidence of their views on the
topic. 272 The text of the document they produced certainly does not
speak of public health, nor of an obligation on the part of the government
to provide protection from dread diseases. Nevertheless, such a belief
would not only have been compatible with their own experience, it would
have comported with their more general political vision. In parts IV.A
and IV.B below, I discuss the political theory of the Framers. In Part
IV.C, I suggest how public health provision and disease prevention may
have been seen in light of the Framers' political views.
property were valid; and that there were obligations upon the public to provide for the poor.
NEDELSKY, supra, at 46.
269. See supra text accompanying notes 23-49.
270. See supra notes 24, 39-43. Justice Rehnquist is most fundamentally a positivist who
believes in judicial deference to the political branches. He has never suggested that govern-
ment cannot choose to provide health protection if it so wishes. Rather, he asserts that govern-
ment has no obligation to so provide, and he treats any decision to provide care as a "mere
gratuity." See supra text accompanying notes 35-48. Rehnquist would also see the Fifth
Amendment Takings Clause as a limit on government power to legislate for public health
reasons. He recently joined Justice Scalia's majority opinion in Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992), which held that the Takings Clause requires states to
compensate landowners for regulatory takings which deprive the landowner of all economic
value unless the prohibited land use would constitute a nuisance at common law. IM at 2886-
901. In other words, Justice Rehnquist and the Lucas majority would implicitly limit the
governments' ability to protect public health by common law understandings, at least in those
cases where regulations deprive property of all value. Professor Epstein would go further. He
claims that all regulatory programs which depart from common law baselines may violate the
Takings Clause of the Constitution. EpnmIN, supra note 53, passim.
271. This is not the same thing as asking whether they assumed an entitlement to health
care in the modern sense. Obviously, in an era long before the development of modern insur-
ance, the Framers could not have imagined something like an entitlement to universal health
insurance. Rather, the question I am asking is whether the Framers conceived of the protec-
tion of health as among the fundamental reasons for and obligations upon government so that
the provision of care would be part of the constitutional structure and, as is discussed below,
connected to the conceptions of rights against the government.
272. For speculation as to why, see part V.A.
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A. The Debate Over the Political Theory of the Framing Era
In recent years there has been considerable debate, first in the histor-
ical and then in the legal literature, about the political views of the fram-
ing generation.273 In particular, the debate has focused on whether the
Framers were predominantly Lockean liberals, as has been traditionally
assumed,2 74 or were predominantly classical republicans in their political
theory.
2 7 5
The view that the Framers were primarily Lockean liberals stresses
the influence of John Locke and his emphasis on individual, natural
rights.276 According to this view, the Framers followed Locke in believ-
ing that individuals and their rights are prior to government, and that the
primary role of law is to protect those rights.2 77 As a result, it is argued
that the Constitution is primarily about limits on government. Taken to
the extreme,2 71 this view can be used to support contemporary doctrine's
assumption that constitutional rights are merely negative restrictions on
273. This debate is discussed in Richard H. Fallon, Jr., What Is Republicanism, and Is It
Worth Reviving?, 102 HARv. L. REV. 1695 (1989). Linda R. Hirschman notes that legal theo-
ries tend to follow, and often adopt, scholarly trends just as they wither in other fields. Linda
R. Hirschman, The Virtue of Liberality in American Communal Life, 88 MICH. L. REv. 983,
988-90 (1990).
274. The classical statement of this view appears in Louis HARTZ, THE LIBERAL TRADI-
TION IN AMERICA 78-86 (1955). More recently, the Lockean influence has been stressed by
JOYCE APPLEBY, CAPITALISM AND A NEW SOCIAL ORDER: THE REPUBLICAN VISION OF
THE 1790s (1984); ISAAC KRAMNICK, REPUBLICANS AND BOURGEOIS RADICALISM: POLrr-
ICAL IDEOLOGY IN LATE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY ENGLAND AND AMERICA (1990); David
A.J. Richards, Liberalism, Public Morality, and Constitutional Law: Prolegomenon to a The-
ory of the Constitutional Right to Privacy, 51 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 123, 124 (1988).
275. Advocates of this position among legal scholars include Frank I. Michelman, Law's
Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493, 1515-24 (1988); Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1985
Term-Forward: Traces of Self-Government, 100 HARv. L. REV. 4, 23-24, 47 (1986) [hereinaf-
ter Michelman, Traces]; Suzanna Sherry, Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice in Constitutional
Adjudication, 72 VA. L. REV. 543, 552 (1986); Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American
Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REv. 29, 47-48 (1985). These legal scholars trace their position to:
BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1967);
J.A. POCOCK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT (1975); GORDON WOOD, THE CREATION OF
THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787 (1969). Other scholars stress the republican influence
on anti-federalist thought. Daniel W. Howe, Anti-Federalist, Federalist Dialogue and Its Im-
plications for Constitutional Understanding 84 Nw. U. L. REv. 1, 2 (1990).
276. David Schultz, The Locke Republican Debate and the Paradox of Property Rights in
Early American Jurisprudence, 13 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 155, 155-56 (1991).
277. Brown, Parmet & Baumann, supra note 30, at 619.
278. Of course, Locke's own views may have been more complex. See Schultz, supra note
276, at 161. The conventional reading stresses the laissez faire, bourgeois aspect of Locke,
with its emphasis on "possessive individualism," to borrow C.B. Macpherson's phrase. See
C.B. MACPHERSON, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF POSSESSIVE INDIVIDUALISM: HOBBES TO
LOCKE 195-262 (1962). This is not the only reading of Locke, nor was it necessarily the view
understood in the 18th century. See Schultz, supra note 276, at 161; infra text accompanying
notes 305-09.
governmental authority.279 The Constitution posits no duties or affirma-
tive responsibilities on the part of government, and assumes a laissez faire
state as the baseline norm.2 80
In contrast, those scholars who argue that the Framers were primar-
ily republicans de-emphasize Locke's influence and stress instead the in-
fluence of classical republican theory as modified by the English country
party.28 ' That so-caled civic humanist tradition stressed the primacy of
political life. It saw individual freedom as emerging only within the con-
text of communal life. 282 Public participation in the self-government of
the community was essential. 283 The danger to republican values lay in
self-interestedness or corruption, which could destroy the virtue and free-
dom of any republic.284
Given its anti-individualistic orientation and its reliance on the
works of seventeenth-century English theorist Thomas Harrington, who
feared maldistribution of wealth as likely to breed self-interestedness or
corruption,285 the argument that the Framers were primarily republican
has served lately as a foil for the libertarian assumptions of conventional
constitutional jurisprudence and has been particularly associated with a
search for affirmative or welfare rights.286 As a political theory which
stresses the communal good and the role of public life in the attainment
of individual fulfillment, classical republicanism obviously conflicts with
the starkly libertarian judgments of today's constitutional doctrine. Fur-
ther, republican theory's emphasis on communal concern and public
caretaking287 seems to support a reading of the Constitution supportive
279. It is implicitly used by Chief Justice Rehnquist in DeShaney v. Winnebago County
Dep't of Social Sers., 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
280. See supra text accompanying notes 28-43.
281. See POCOCK, supra note 275, at 506-22.
282. JAMES HARRINGTON, THE COMMONWEALTH OF OCEANA, reprinted in THE POLIT-
ICAL WRITINGS OF JAMES HARRINGTON: REPRESENTATIVE SELECTIONS 56-60 (Charles
Blitzer ed., 1955); POCOCK, supra note 275, at 49-80; Kathryn Abrams, Law's Republicanism,
97 YALE L.J. 1591, 1592 (1988).
283. Michelman, Traces, supra note 275, at 56.
284. Schultz, supra note 276, at 156; see also Gregory S. Alexander, Time and Property in
the American Legal Culture, 66 N.Y.U. L. REv. 273, 280-81 (1991).
285. HARRINGTON, supra note 282, at 119-31 (arguing for the division of large estates).
286. See, eg., Hirshman, supra note 273, at 1023-24. Yet the republican critique has come
from the ideological right as well as the left. See KRAMNICK, supra note 274, at 369.
Kramnick calls the use of the republican thesis by the left ironic, because he believes that the
tradition was originally reactionary. Today it may provide an alternative to the now-en-
trenched Lockean world-view. Id. at 39. It is that entrenched and, I would claim, distorted
version of Locke that lies behind the conventional assumptions underpinning contemporary
constitutional and health law jurisprudence.
287. Thus, feminist theorists have attempted to connect the republican strand in American
constitutional theory with a supposedly feminine voice that stresses social connectedness and
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of mutual caring and the primacy of public values. 2"8
This radical, if not utopian, view of the republican influence on the
framing era is certainly vulnerable to dispute. Overstated, it overlooks
the all too evident influence of Locke in eighteenth century American
thought and the Framers' concern with the preservation of property.289
And it is not easily reconciled with the text of The Federalist Papers and
its partial preoccupation with the problem of self-interest and the need to
check power.290 Moreover, even if the Framers were card-carrying civic
republicans, that hardly means that they were advocates for the Great
Society or any other version of modem welfare statism. As Linda
Hirschman has noted correctly, the republican revisionists have been far
more successful in demonstrating the republican influence on the Fram-
ers' beliefs about political participation and self-government than they
have been in connecting its influence to any substantive values or
policies.291
The assertion that the Framers assumed a public health obligation
on the part of government depends, however, neither on the acceptance
nor on the rejection of the Lockean or republican hypotheses. The asser-
tion is surprisingly compatible with modified versions of both theories,
and may even highlight the ways in which the framing generation inter-
wove theories that, considered abstractly, appear antagonistic.
The key to understanding why eighteenth century thought may have
presumed a public health obligation lies first in the recognition that the
Framers were primarily practical politicians and only secondarily polit-
ical theorists. The purity of their theory was less important to them than
its ability to resolve the problems they faced,292 legitimate the govern-
nurturing values. Kenneth L. Karst, Woman's Constitution, 1984 DUKE L.J. 447, 486-95;
Sherry, supra note 275, at 530-37. Of course, there is nothing in classical republican theory
itself which stresses values of nurturance. Communalism need not be empathetic and can
easily be intolerant. See Abrams, supra note 282, at 1606-07; Howe, supra note 275, at 3.
288. I take this to be a greatly oversimplified statement of Beauchamp's view. See DAN E.
BEAUCHAMP, THE HEALTH OF THE REPUBLIC: EPIDEMICS, MEDICINE, AND MORALISM AS
CHALLENGES TO DEMOCRACY (1988).
289. See Richards, supra note 274, at 128. The classic statement on the Framers' concern
for their economic self-interest is CHARLES BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (1935).
290. See, eg., THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison).
291. Hirshman, supra note 273, at 985.
292. This obviously raises a significant hurdle for any theory that purports to interpret the
Constitution solely in accordance with the original understanding of the Framers. Even as to
those issues on which there was substantial agreement among the Framers, their views often
are not subject to logical deduction, because they were eclectic and often contradictory. Their
preference for pragmatism over purity stands in sharp contrast to the formalism characteristic
of the Rehnquist court. See Douglas Laycock, The Remnants of Free Exercise, 1990 Sup. CT.
REv. 1, 38.
ment they needed,293 and provide a stable political order.294 As a result,
the Framers, unlike many modem-day scholars, drew from a variety of
sources: from the republican to the liberal, the classical to the Enlighten-
ment.295 Protestant morality,296 as well as the English common law, es-
pecially their reading of Blackstone, guided their beliefs and framed their
vision.2 97 As Isaac Kramnick has written, "There was a profusion and
confusion of political tongues among the founders. They lived easily
with that clatter; it is we, two hundred and more years later, who chafe
at their inconsistency. ', 298
The Framers could borrow from many theories because they did not
appear as incompatible to them as the theories do to us. Of course, the
differences between liberal and republican, not to mention federalist and
anti-federalist,2 99 were real and were of critical consequence to a number
of issues. Theoretically, the republican and liberal strands differed over
the relationship between the common good and the sum of individual
goods,3"o and which was instrumental to which.30 1 Another significant
293. Thad W. Tate, The Social Contract in America, 1774-1787- Revolutionary Theory as a
Conservative Instrument, 22 WM. & MARY Q. 375, 385-87, 391 (1965).
294. McDONALD, supra note 163, at 291.
295. Id; Howe, supra note 275, at 1-2; Schultz, supra note 276, at 157-58. McDonald
stresses the divisions and wide range of influences within American republican thought. Mc-
DONALD, supra note 163, at 66-67. He argues that the founding generation held a variety of
beliefs stemming from a plurality of influences that to us would seem contradictory. Id. Joyce
Oldham Appleby stresses the Enlightenment influence on the framing generation, especially
upon Jefferson. Joyce Oldham Appleby, What Is Still American in the Political Philosophy of
Thomas Jefferson, 39 WM. & MARY Q. 287, 290-94 (1982) (tracing Montesquieu's influence on
Jefferson and Madison).
296. McDONALD, supra note 163, at 70-72.
297. Id. at 59; J. JOHN PHILLIP REID, THE CONCEPT OF LIBERTY IN THE AGE OF THE
AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1988) (stressing the English common law tradition in American
constitutional thought); see also Schultz, supra note 276, at 169-70 (emphasizing Blackstone's
influence on American views of property).
298. KRAMNICK, supra note 274, at 261.
299. For a discussion of the federalist/anti-federalist debate, see Howe, supra note 275,
passim.
300. The republican strand clearly emphasized that the common good was greater than the
sum of individual goods. RONALD PETERS JR., THE MASSACHUSETTS CONSTITUTION OF
1780 94-98 (1978). Incipient individualists saw the matter somewhat differently. As John
Trenchard, a veteran of the "paper war" of 1698, and his protege Thomas Gordon wrote in
Cato's Letters, "What is the Publick, but the collective Body of private Men, as every private
Man is a member of the Publick? And as the Whole ought to be concerned for the Preserva-
tion of every private Individual, it is the Duty of every Individual to be concerned for the
Whole, in which himself is included." CATO'S LETTERS, No. 38, reprinted in THE ENGLISH
LIBERTARIAN HERITAGE 93, 99 (David L. Jacobson ed., 3d ed. 1965).
301. Stephen Holmes notes that individualism was critical to early liberals as a way of
breaking down the loyalties of caste, clan, ethnicity, and family. Stephen Holmes, Liberal
Guilt: Some Theoretical Origins of the Welfare State, in RESPONSIBILITY, RIGHTS, AND WEL-
FARE: THE THEORY OF THE WELFARE STATE 77, 96 (J. Moon ed., 1988).
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difference concerned what constituted freedom in the state of nature, 0 2
which is but another way of asking whether individuals are primarily
political or apolitical, communal or self-interested.30 3
What our current preoccupation with these very real differences ob-
scures is that in the eighteenth century, before industrialization and ur-
banization irrevocably altered social life, 3° there was still much upon
which all sides of the republican-liberal debate could agree.30 5 Moreover,
there was a political construct-with its own shared language and as-
sumptions-to which all sides subscribed. Social contract theory was
that construct.30 6
B. Social Contract Theory
Social contract theory is typically associated with Thomas Hobbes,
John Locke, and a liberal tradition that assumes the primacy of individu-
als. Although liberal individualism clearly formed a significant strand of
the theory, social contract theory was amorphous and elastic enough to
accommodate a variety of political psychologies and ideologies. That
Thomas Hobbes and John Locke, James Madison and Jean Jacques
Rousseau could al speak in the language of social contract suggests that
the theory did not exclude either liberals or republicans, utopians or pes-
simists, individualists or communitarians. It was, rather, a bridge by
which the separate and often contradictory strands of eighteenth century
political theory could come together.30 7
At its most general level, the one upon which all could agree, social
contract theory stressed that political legitimacy derived from the con-
sent of the governed.30 8 Radically, the theory postulated that individuals
302. Many at the time saw liberty as existing only within the social contract. REID, supra
note 297, at 80. Lockean thought broke with earlier views by considering an abstracted liberty
that could be conceptualized, even if not fully realized, apart from the sovereign. APPLEBY,
supra note 274, at 18-19. From this conception, government can be a threat to liberty, since
liberty can preexist the social contract. Such a possibility cannot be fathomed from a classical
republican, or indeed traditional common law, perspective. REID, supra note 297, at 5-6.
303. According to David Howe, this is where The Federalist Papers departed from earlier
classical theory. Classical republican theory assumed that human virtue could exist only
through public life. The writers of The Federalist Papers were less sanguine. While they ac-
cepted the existence of virtue, they were cognizant of self-interest, and believed it provided a
surer footing than virtue for obtaining the public good. Howe, supra note 267, at 507-08.
304. See infra text accompanying notes 414-16.
305. See MARK TUSHNET, RED, WHITE, AND BLUE 7 (1988).
306. Tate, supra note 293, at 386-87.
307. Peters explores these influences, especially the republican influences in social contract
theory in his study of the Massachusetts constitution of 1780. PETERS, supra note 300,passim.
Barker traces the theory back to Plato's era. SOCIAL CONTRACT: ESAYS BY LOCKE, HuME,
AND ROUSSEAU at vii (Ernest Barker ed., 1960).
308. PETERS, supra note 300, at 136-38.
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came together from a pre-political state, first to form a social compact in
which they agreed to live in society and then a governmental compact in
which they granted authority to the government. °9
As an abstract and general theory, social contract had much to offer
both republicans and liberals. To republicans, social contract theory em-
phasized the need for a social contract 310 to enable passage out of the
individualistic state of nature and into a civil society where the common
good could be pursued.311 Under this view, the goal of the social con-
tract was the fulfillment of the common good. 312 As Samuel West stated
in 1776, "Thus we see that both reason and relation perfectly agree in
pointing out the nature, end, and design of government, viz., that it is to
promote the welfare and happiness of the community. ' 313 Unless govern-
ments fulfill these obligations and pursue the common good, they lack
legitimacy.31 4
In the eighteenth century, liberals did not disagree about the role or
essential meaning of the social contract. After all, it was John Locke,
that early individualist, 315 who wrote that the legislative power "can
never be suppos'd to extend farther than the common good but is obliged
to secure every one's Property' 316 and that the authority and powers of
the state are "to be directed to no other end, but the Peace, Safety, and
public good of the People., 3 1 7 The preservation of property as an indi-
vidual right was emphasized by Locke, and later by Madison,318 but
property also played a critical role in the republican tradition.319 Before
309. See Barker, supra note 307, at xii; PETERS, supra note 300, at 95.
310. Peters discusses how the drafters of the Massachusetts constitution of 1780 followed
Hobbes in seeing the state of nature as a bleak place in which there was constant war. PETERS,
supra note 300, at 90-94.
311. See id. at 103.
312. THE POPULAR SOURCES OF PoLmIcAL AuTHoIUTY: DOCUMENTS ON THE MASSA-
CHUSETTS CONSTITUTION OF 1780, at 26 (Oscar Handlin & Mary Handlin eds., 1966).
313. PETERS, supra note 300, at 106 (quoting Samuel West).
314. Id.
315. Bussiere argues that Locke was ambiguous about societal obligations to the poor.
Elizabeth Bussiere, Social Welfare and the Courts: The Dilemmas of Liberalism 59 (1989)
(dissertation, Brandeis University, Univ. Microfilms No. 8910659). Stephen Holmes also em-
phasizes the continuity between the thinking of Locke and Hobbes and modem welfare state
theories. Holmes, supra note 301, at 80, 86.
316. LOCKE, supra note 81, at 131. Barker argues that Locke believed that the govern-
ment's obligations were closer to those placed upon a trustee, under equity doctrine, than those
founded upon legal theories of contract. BARKER, supra note 307, at xxiii.
317. LOCKE, supra note 81, at 131.
318. NEDELSKY, supra note 268, at 22.
319. Michelman, supra note 268, at 1330; Sherry, supra note 275, at 556. The key differ-
ence between Lockeans and classical republicans was not the importance of property, but
whether or not it should be tied to established forms of individual labor. KRAMNICK, supra
note 274, at 193-99.
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the triumph of laissez faire capitalism in the nineteenth century,3 20 liber-
als and republicans alike could and did speak the language of social con-
tract, which included an assertion that governments are created to fulfill
the public good.
To Americans searching for a way to legitimate their separation
from England, social contract theory provided an ideal inspiration. With
its emphasis on the consent of the governed and its insistence that com-
pacts made can be broken, the theory appeared to provide a legalistic
justification for American independence from England. 321 It is thus not
surprising that Jefferson relied upon the rhetoric of social contract theory
in the Declaration of Independence.322
Social contract theory provided more than a justification for
America's independence. It also helped to legitimate state, and eventu-
ally federal, authority once independence was achieved. 323 Although
often misunderstanding the technical details of the theory, Americans
after the Revolution perceived that their governmental contract had dis-
solved. 324 They thus turned to social contract theory to legitimate the
governmental authority they sought. State constitutions,325 and ulti-
mately the federal one, were conceived as new social contracts among the
people which would legitimate the authority of the state. This is most
evident in the Constitution's preamble "We the People" and in its reli-
ance on ratification by the states "in convention ' 326 rather than by the
legislatures. It was this ratification of the document by conventions that
led Chief Justice Marshall years later to see the Constitution as deriving
320. Kramnick argues that the liberal, individualistic influence emerged earlier in Ameri-
can thought, although he does not disagree that in the framing generation it was still intermin-
gled with notions of a common good and was not yet a theory of laissez faire. KRAMNICK,
supra note 274, at 196.
321. Tate, supra note 293, at 378. Of course, the "law" was natural law, but the use of
social contract theory envisioned a natural law that took much of the form, and indeed much
of the substance, of prior positive law.
322. The Declaration states in relevant part:
We hold these Truths to be self-evident, that all Men are created equal, that they
are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights, that among these are
life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness-That to secure these rights, governments
are instituted among men, deriving their just Powers from the Consent of the Gov-
erned, that whenever any form of government becomes destructive of these Ends, it is
the Right of the People to alter or abolish it, and to institute new government, laying
its Foundation on such Principles, and organizing its Powers in such Form, as to
them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness.
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
323. Tate, supra note 293, at 386.
324. Id. at 37; see also PETERs, supra note 300, at 66-69 (arguing that after the Revolution,
Americans were confused as to whether they were in a state of nature or a civil society).
325. Tate, supra note 293, at 282-286.
326. U.S. CONST. art. VII.
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its authority not from the states, but from the people as a whole.32 7
Social contract theory further provided a basis for judging govern-
ments. Implicit in the view that the compact between the British and
Americans had been broken by the time of the Declaration of Indepen-
dence was the theory that governments which fail to respect the social
compact are, in effect, illegitimate. Further, to fulfill compact obliga-
tions, governments must serve the common good.328 State constitutions
of the confederation era were replete with such statements.329 The Vir-
ginia Constitution of 1776 is illustrative:
That government is, or ought to be, instituted for the common ben-
efit, protection, and security of the people, nation, or community
... and that which government shall be found inadequate or con-
trary to these purposes, a majority of the community hath an indu-
bitable, inalienable, and indefeasible right to reform, alter, or
abolish it, in such manner as shall be judged most conducive to
public weal.33
0
Its words were echoed eleven years later in the Constitution's preamble:
"We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect
Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the
common defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings
of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this
Constitution .... , 33 1 The same vision appears in The Federalist Papers,
which states that "[t]he aim of every political constitution is, or ought to
be, first to obtain for rulers men who possess most wisdom to discern,
and most virtue to pursue, the common good of the society., 332
327. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 403 (1819).
328. Respect for, if not protection of, pre-existing natural rights also played a role in con-
tract theory's view of governmental legitimacy. Thus, Locke emphasized natural rights of
property; see supra text accompanying notes 318-19. Jefferson, in the Declaration of Indepen-
dence, pointed to England's violation of the colonists' "unalienable rights" as the reason for
the colonists' Declaration of Independence. Social contract theory's recognition of negative
rights did not exclude a purposeful or positive reason for the formation and legitimation of
governments. Indeed, even the Declaration of Independence, which was perhaps the era's
most libertarian exposition of social contract ideology, saw governments as being created to
"effect" the People's "safety and happiness." As shown in this section, other statements of the
era, including the Constitution, gave greater emphasis to the common good.
329. See, eg., MD. CONST. of 1776 ("That all government of right originates from the
people, is founded in compact only, and instituted solely for the good of whole."); VT. CONST.
of 1777 ("[A]II government ought to be instituted and supported for the security and protec-
tion of the community"); MASS. CONST. of 1780, pmbl. ("The body politic is formed by a
voluntary association of individuals: it is a social compact, by which the whole people cove-
nants with each citizen, and each citizen with the whole people, that all shall be governed by
certain laws for the common good.").
330. VA. CONST. of 1776, § 3.
331. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
332. THE FEDERALIST No. 57, at 244 (James Madison) (Charles A. Beard ed., 1964).
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C. Public Health as a Common Good
The eighteenth century belief in government's compact obligation to
fulfill the common good is consistent with the pattern of regulation and
provision evident in colonial and early federalist public health regula-
tions. More fundamentally, it suggests that the framing generation may
have seen the duty to protect health as stemming from the social or gov-
ernmental contract in which individual and state were related by mutual
obligations.
Although social contract theorists, and the framing generation in
general, spoke often about the public good, the common weal, and the
general welfare, they provided remarkably little elucidation of those
phrases. Social contract theory was eclectic and amorphous. While eve-
ryone might have agreed about the government's obligation to protect
the public good, they often disagreed about exactly what that meant. To
Locke, the concept was ultimately individualistic. Individuals agree to
leave the state of nature "for the mutual Preservation of their Lives, Lib-
erties and Estates, which I call by the general Name Property."'333 Jeffer-
son, echoing that language, saw preservation of "life, liberty and the
pursuit of happiness" as the goal of government.334 Madison saw the
preservation of property as among the primary reasons for having gov-
ernment.335 He may have seen that goal as largely instrumental, how-
ever, since he believed that the preservation of property was essential to
maintaining the ability of government to achieve the common good.336
Despite the disagreement and uncertainty over the actual meaning
of "the common good," it seems likely that the preservation of public
health, as exemplified by protection against epidemics, was one meaning
that all would share. Tradition and practice pointed to it. Theorists
such as Montesquieu supported it.337 So did popular political discourse.
According to historian Ronald Peters, "the answer of the literature is
unequivocal on this point: the only end of civil society is the common
good. And the sine qua non of the common good is public safety-salus
populi suprem lex est.' ' 338 In an era of frequent epidemics, safety meant
333. LOCKE, supra note 81, § 123, at 368.
334. See supra note 322.
335. Letter from James Madison to Caleb Wallace (Aug. 23, 1785), in THE MIND OF THE
FOUNDER: SOURCES OF THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF JAMES MADISON 49 (Marvin Meyers
ed., 1973).
336. Michelman, supra note 268, at 1331-33.
337. MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF LAWS bk. 23, ch. 29, at 316-18 (David W. Carrithers
ed., 1977) (discussing public hospitals and stating that all states owe citizens life compatible
with health).
338. PETERS, supra note 300, at 103.
more than protection from foes-it likely included, or was often associ-
ated with, preservation of health.339
The equation of public health with safety, and thereby with the com-
mon good, did not necessarily derive from any heightened sense of altru-
ism. 4 To say that the framing generation believed that the social
contract obligated government to protect the public's health and to pro-
vide care to the ill is not to say that they were utopians or even humani-
tarians. Many in the framing generation supported slavery. They also
held negative views about the indigent.3 ' Much of the care provided to
the indigent ill emerged from the almshouse and poor law tradition,342 a
tradition not known for the dignity and respect it bestowed upon the
poor.343 It was, therefore, not altruism that caused public health to be
part of the common good, but a tradition31 motivated by the pragma-
tism and pessimism 345 derived from the insecurity of life in a preindus-
trial age.346
In an era of frequent epidemics, when an increasing number of phy-
sicians thought disease stemmed either from accumulated filth in public
places or from contagion,347 it likely appeared self-evident that public
health protection constituted a core element of the common good. The
idea commonly held today that health is a matter of individual life style
choices and treatments determined privately by patients and physi-
cians 348 would have seemed insufficient in the eighteenth century. 349
Government always had attempted to protect public health, and it al-
339. This view was more clearly stated in later police power cases, where the courts in-
voked "saluspopulisuprem lex est" in support of government authority to isolate the ill. Hav-
erty v. Bass, 66 Me. 71, 73-74 (1876). Indeed, in 19th century cases, health care was often
posited as the clear example of government authority under the police power. Parmet, supra
note 5, at 744-45.
340. Nonetheless, some early social moralists such as Richard Woodward and William
Paley relied upon social contract theory to argue for increased rights for the poor. See Thomas
Home, Welfare Rights as Property Rights, in RESPONSIBILITY, RIGHTS, AND WELFARE, supra
note 301, at 131-41; Bussiere, supra note 315, at 59-60.
341. Albert M. Bendich, Privacy, Poverty, and the Constitution, 54 CAL. L. REv. 407, 416
(1966).
342. Thus, for example, the Guardians of the Poor, who kept the almshouse in Philadel-
phia, were responsible for caring for the poor during the epidemic of 1793. POWELL, supra
note 193, at 57-58; see also ROSENBERG, supra note 194, at 29, 52.
343. See supra text accompanying notes 97-98.
344. See supra text accompanying notes 98-101.
345. See infra text accompanying notes 347-51.
346. APPLEBY, supra note 274, at 27.
347. See supra text accompanying notes 195-97.
348. See supra note 65.
349. Many, however, thought disease was God's chastisement and a matter of personal
responsibility in that it fell upon the sinner. See supra text accompanying notes 110-12.
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ways would.35 0 Whether one endorsed a republican theory of communal
virtue or a liberal theory of self-interest, 351 pragmatism compelled the
same conclusion. Public health was a prerequisite to public safety. It
constituted a part of the common good. As a result, under social con-
tract theory, government was not only entitled, but also obligated, to
protect public health.
The different schools of thought would have framed the issue from
different theoretical perspectives. Those influenced by classical republi-
can thought accepted communal obligations and their primacy over indi-
vidual rights.35 2 With such a view, in a time of repeated epidemics which
could regularly kill a large percentage of the population, protection of
public health fit easily within understanding of the public good.353 More-
over, the classical republican emphasis on self-government would also
have pointed to a further relationship between the public health and the
common good.3 54 As the framing generation knew only too well, self-
government becomes insecure under the threat of epidemics. Colonial
history, in which governments repeatedly had to adjourn in the face of
epidemics, would have suggested to the Framers the dangers disease
posed to self-rule. 355 Although it occurred after the ratification of the
Constitution, the collapse of civil government in Philadelphia in 1793
followed a scenario that the Framers could have imagined.35 6 Even with-
out the total collapse of self-government, the republican ideal would have
required government to care for the ill because individuals who lack
health cannot participate in government. 357  Public health, therefore,
350. See supra text accompanying notes 66-266.
351. Recall that the prevention of epidemics is at least partially a public good, which even
modem market theory understands requires public action. See supra text accompanying notes
60-62.
352. See supra text accompanying notes 281-84.
353. BEAUCHAMP, supra note 288, tries to do just that, building upon WALZER, supra note
67, passim. The interesting question for 20th century republican theory is whether the decline
of epidemics led to a decline in perceived social obligation. Duffy, for example, suggests that
public concern always waned when threats of epidemics receded. DUFFY, SANITARIANS, supra
note 74, at 53.
354. POCOCK, supra note 275, at 521. To many at the time, disease itselfwas seen as a sign
of corruption and decline. Jefferson and his friend Dr. Benjamin Rush, for example, believed
that certain diseases only occurred in corrupt monarchies. George Rosen, Political Order and
Human Health in Jeffersonian Thought, 26 BULL. HIST. MED. 32-44 (1952).
355. DUFFY, EPIDEMICS, supra note 117, at 110.
356. See supra text accompanying notes 218-31.
357. Michelman has most extensively developed this aspect of the republican argument for
welfare rights. According to Miechelman, under a republican vision self-government requires a
certain minimal provision. Michelman, Possession vs. Distribution, supra note 268, at 1329.
Although Michelman makes his argument primarily with respect to real property rights, the
same could well be said of health care. See also NORMAN DANIELS, JUST HEALTH CARE 36-
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would have been a necessary part of the common good because it was a
precondition to maintaining the republic wherein that good could
flourish.358
Lockeans would also have seen public health protection as falling
within their understanding of the common good. To Locke, for example,
the social contract creating civil society was formed not because the state
of nature was idyllic, but because it was insecure. Without social protec-
tions, individuals pose threats to one another. Individuals enter into so-
ciety "only with an intention in every one the better to preserve himself
his Liberty and Property. ' 359 Included within Locke's definition of an
individual's property was the individual's "own Person.,,360 Although
the protection of property was an essential element of Lockean thought,
so too was the protection of self.
In a time of frequent epidemics, the preservation of self and prop-
erty almost inevitably would have been seen as requiring public efforts to
prevent the spread of disease. As individuals came into contact with
each other, as commerce and population grew, epidemics developed.361
Individuals faced death, commerce was destroyed, and property was
threatened.362 The preservation of individual interests thus necessarily
required efforts to prevent disease. Whether contagionist or sanitarian,
pragmatism-not benevolence-ultimately required the care of those
who could not afford to care for themselves. Without provision for the
poor, including their treatment during times of illness, and steps such as
inoculation designed to prevent illness, other individual interests would
have remained insecure.363 Thus, individual preservation was inextrica-
bly linked to public health policies.3 4 If the Lockean individualist en-
57 (1985) (arguing that a certain minimum of health care is necessary to permit individuals to
participate as members of human society).
358. Of course, this is circular. But then, as many have pointed out, there was an inherent
circularity in 18th century republican thought. PETERS, supra note 300, at 103-07. Peters
ultimately concludes from this circularity that there was no substantive content whatsoever to
the idea of the common good and that the idea ultimately collapsed into majoritarianism-i.e.,
the common good was whatever the majority said it was. While this may have been the effec-
tive result, the conclusion that there was no meaning to the notion at all contrasts with the
natural law underpinnings of social contract theory. BARKER, supra note 307, at x-xii.
359. LOCKE, supra note 81, § 131, at 371.
360. Id. § 27, at 305.
361. See supra text accompanying notes 56-58.
362. Thus, for example, during the 1793 Philadelphia epidemic, commerce in Philadelphia
suffered. Thousands became poor because of the epidemic. POWELL, supra note 193, at 242,
264-77; see also DuFFY, EPIDEMICS, supra note 117, at 111.
363. See POWELL, supra note 193, at 58 (observing that unless the Philadelphia poor were
treated, everyone was at risk).
364. This still applies today. Individual solutions remain incapable of servicing the public's
health, as the re-emergence of tuberculosis makes all too clear. See UNITED HOsPITAL FUND,
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tered the social contract to preserve his or her own self and property,
then the society's obligation under that contract would by necessity have
included the protection of the public's health, the only way in which the
individual's health could be reasonably protected.365
D. Social Contract Theory and Public Health Protection
Social contract theory, in both its individualistic and republican
forms, supported an assumption that the public good required the protec-
tion of health. As a result, the state was not only empowered to protect
the public's health, but was obligated to do so, at least under natural, if
not positive, law.366 A government that failed to protect health violated
the terms of its compact and had no right to expect obedience. A govern-
ment's authority was a function of its fulfillment of its duties.
Under social contract theory, individuals gave obedience or consent
to society on the understanding that they would receive protection from
it. Far from endorsing a laissez faire understanding of the relationship
between individual and state, as is often mistakenly assumed,367 social
contract theory in its eighteenth century form actually assumed a recip-
rocal relationship between individual rights and governmental duties.
supra note 34, at 5-6. The health of individuals depends, to a large degree, on public matters
such as sanitation, the healthfulness of the environment, and the existence of communicable
and infectious diseases in others. Victor W. Seidel, Health Care in the United States, A Thou-
sand Points of Blight, 5 ARTHRITIS CARE & RESEARCH 63, 63-64 (1992).
365. Locke himself focused on the formation of the original social compact and gave little
amplification to the secondary governmental contract. BARKER, supra note 307, at xiii, xxiii.
Americans, however, tended to conflate the two, seeing their break with England, for example,
as resulting from the violation of the social compact itself. Tate, supra note 293, at 378. As a
result, Americans may have assumed that governments formed by the governmental compact
incurred the obligations Locke placed upon society due to the social compact.
366. There is no doubt that the social contract views of the framing era were deeply infused
with concepts of natural law. MCDONALD, supra note 163, at 65-66; PETERS, supra note 300,
at 66-70. Thus, to the framing era, obligations under the social contract were indeed obliga-
tory or law-like. They were not mere moral or subjective preferences. On the other hand, the
Framers' belief that an obligation under the social contract derived from natural law does not
imply that the Framers approved of the use of natural law by judges to review edicts of positive
law. See Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 398-400 (1798) (Iredell, J., dissenting); REID,
supra note 297, at 28-29 (arguing that beliefs in natural law did not mean that natural law
trumped positive law; rather, natural law was usually assumed to reside within positive law);
compare Suzanna Sherry, The Founder's Unwritten Constitution, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 1127,
1151-77 (1987) (arguing for judges to use natural law in constitutional cases) with ROBERT
BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 209-10 (1990). In more contemporary parlance, the
Framers' belief that governments that did not protect public health were illegitimate does not
imply that the Framers believed individuals had judicially enforceable rights against govern-
ments which breached that duty. For further discussion, see infra text accompanying notes
421-25.
367. See supra text accompanying notes 23-30.
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Under this understanding of the legitimacy of the state, individual
rights, such as rights of property,3 68 were necessarily curtailed by the
social and governmental compacts.369 In society, as opposed to the state
of nature, individuals did not have unlimited or absolute control over
themselves or their property.370 Their rights were necessarily limited by
social obligation. This fully accorded with the common law's under-
standing of property, especially the law of nuisance which limited prop-
erty rights in the public interest.371 It also accorded with the experiences
of a mercantilist society in which regulation, not free enterprise, was the
norm.372 Most importantly, this view of rights would have been compat-
ible with the era's public health practices, which limited and even im-
pounded property in order to protect the public health.373 The framing
generation would have had no reason to see a conflict between rights of
368. Reid and McDonald make the point that the common law's recognition of rights of
property in the 18th century was not at all absolutist or incompatible with regulation for the
common good. McDONALD, supra note 163, at 14; REID, supra note 297, at 2, 32-39, 59.
Only in the 19th century, after the advent of a far more laissez faire ideology, did governmen-
tal health regulations begin to appear to be in conflict with rights of property. Parmet, supra
note 5, at 750.
369. The republican strand saw property rights as deriving from, or at least, dependent
upon the social contract. See supra text accompanying notes 310-20. Locke's unique contribu-
tion was to define property as pre-existing the social contract. LocKE, supra note 81, § 123, at
368. Hobbes saw rights existing pre-socially, but envisioned their complete subordination to
the governmental compact enthroning the plenary sovereign. HOBBES, supra note 80, at 160-
61.
370. PETERS, supra note 300, at 100 (citing William Whiting). Locke, ironically, did not
fully support the idea of plenary property rights even in the state of nature. He recognized that
even in the state nature, property rights were curtailed by the law of necessity. Bussiere, supra
note 315, at 58.
371. See EPSTEIN, supra note 53, at 111-12 (discussing how nuisance limits private rights
when those rights entail public wrongs); MCDONALD, supra note 163, at 63-65; SCHWARTZ,
supra note 61, at 18-46; cf Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2898-
901 (1992). Of course, the government's ability to limit property rights was itself limited by
the idea of natural rights, which were inalienable under social contract theory. See PETERS,
supra note 300, at 87. Eventually, in the 19th century, property rights began to be viewed as
absolute and protected in their absolutism by natural law. This was the view of natural law
that culminated in the substantive due process doctrine of the Lochner-era Court. See Lochner
v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). This view may be returning, given the Court's recent hold-
ing that the Takings Clause limits certain uncompensated regulations to common law base-
lines, regardless of the strength of the state's justification. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2889-901. This
interpretation resembles Lochner in that it takes the common law as static, immune from re-
consideration. Id. at 2921 (Stevens, J., dissenting). It fails to recognize the common law's
broader imperative that private rights must be reconciled with the public good.
372. McDONALD, supra note 163, at 13-41.
373. This practice accorded with the common law view of takings, which assumed that
government could take private property for public, but not private, use. See EPSTEIN, supra
note 54, at 111; Morton J. Horwitz, 1787: The Constitution Perspective: Republicanism and
Liberalism in American Constitutional Thought, 29 WM. & MARY L. REv. 57, 68 (1987) [here-
inafter Horwitz, Republicanism].
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property and public health protection. Even opponents of redistribution,
such as Madison, 74 would not have seen public health measures as
redistributive. 75
To Locke and the Framers, the social compact was a way of theoret-
ically delineating the necessary relationship between individual, society,
and the state. Individual rights were curtailed not because they were not
recognized or respected, but only because they were ultimately to be real-
ized by achieving the common good which government was obligated by
compact to fulfill.
As a result, the sharp distinction that exists under modem doctrine
between positive and negative rights376 could not have existed in the
framing era with respect to public health care. As many scholars have
pointed out, eighteenth century thought did not generally distinguish be-
tween positive and negative rights and liberties the way we do today.3 77
Under common law, in contrast to DeShaney, any person who gave alle-
giance to a government was entitled to have her health and security pro-
tected by it.378 Allegiance and protection were reciprocal and even
correlative.3 79
Thus, the pattern of colonial and early federalist public health laws
accords with the understanding of rights and liberties, obligations and
duties, prevailing at the time of the Constitution's framing. Govern-
ments were not only empowered to protect the public health, but were
expected to do so. When crises occurred, they were expected to act.
Their authority to do so was unquestioned.
Individual rights of property, travel, and even access to one's home
gave way before the public health power. Those restraints were not seen
as violations of individual liberties, as we might see them today. Rather,
they were part and parcel of the relationship under the social or govern-
mental contract: a construct which gave society a claim upon individuals
374. NEDELSKY, supra note 268, at 30; Horwitz, Republicanism, supra note 373, at 64.
375. Remnants of this view persisted until the 1930s. Under the classical view of the police
power, government did not violate individual rights as long as government acted to promote
the public's health, morals, or welfare. See Parmet, supra note 5, at 744. Regulations to benefit
particular rather than public interests, however, were seen as redistributive and ultimately
ultra vires. See, eg., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 64 (1905); Horwitz, Republicanism,
supra note 373, at 59-60.
376. See supra text accompanying notes 11-27.
377. WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: FROM POLITICAL PRINCI-
PLE TO JUDICIAL DOCTRINE 25-26 (1988); REID, supra note 297, at 2; Bussiere, supra note
315, at 49.
378. NELSON, supra note 377, at 25.
379. Id at 26 (quoting from THEODORE D. WELD, SLAVERY IN THE DISTRICT OF CO-
LUMBIA 278 (1838)).
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only in return for the fulfillment of its obligation to provide care and
protection. Thus, when ships arrived from plague-infested ports, they
could be quarantined. Homes could be impounded; privies regulated.
When individuals were sick, they were cared for. When they could not
afford care, it was usually provided. As members of the society, individ-
uals lacked absolute rights; instead, they received the benefits of the
epidemics or plagues that were prevented by the authority of government
acting to preserve the common good.
V. Explaining the Silence: The Impact of Federalism
A. The Federal Debate
My conclusion that the framing generation assumed a governmental
obligation to protect the public is compatible with the practice and the-
ory of the time. A mystery, however, remains. Why does the Constitu-
tion not simply say "the government is obligated to protect the health of
citizens?" The answer to that question may lie in the self-evident nature
of the public health obligation from the Framers' perspective. The duty
was not controversial and was not a subject of debate. States and local
governments acted to protect the public health. Their authority and obli-
gation to do so was not on the table.
The years between the Declaration of Independence and the ratifica-
tion of the Constitution were characterized by intense political debate in
America. As a new nation engaged in the uniquely self-conscious act of
nation-making, many issues were open for discussion: the relationship
between the states; the role of the federal government; the degree of pro-
tection to be afforded to creditors as opposed to debtors; the power of the
national executive; the role of the judiciary; and what to do about the evil
of slavery. Little discussion, however, focused upon those matters, pri-
marily considered to be local, which were not subject to controversy nor
in need of change. As the historian David Howe has emphasized, the
theory of The Federalist Papers, and one might add of the Constitution
itself, was never meant to be a complete political theory.380 It was not a
comprehensive analysis of the relationship of individual to government
or of the nature of rights themselves. Those issues, understood through
the teachings of the common law and the experience of communities, and
developed in the theory of social contract, were simply irrelevant to the
debate of 1787.381 There was, therefore, no need to discuss them in the
380. HowE, supra note 267, at 506.
381. Id.; see also Tate, supra note 293, at 389-90 (Framers assumed that the laws would
continue).
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debates and pamphlets surrounding the Constitution's ratification.
Federalism, moreover, provides another key to understanding the
paucity of discussion about the public health obligation. The central is-
sue in the constitutional debates of 1787 was the reformulation of the
relationship between the states and the central government. Federalists
saw the need for a strengthened national government to preserve national
unity, and ultimately to secure the rights of property 8 2 and fruits of
commerce. 383 For a variety of reasons, the anti-federalists distrusted in-
creased centralization and feared that the federal scheme would jeopard-
ize the role of the states.384 The federalists responded by justifying the
need for increased nationalization and dismissed the anti-federalist fears.
They argued against a bill of rights, claiming it would be misread as con-
stituting the exclusive list of federal rights.385 Neither federalists nor
anti-federalists, however, felt the need to debate the obligations of local
governments. Thus, a state or local government's obligation to protect
the public health was not at issue.
John Jay's discussion in The Federalist No. 3 provides a good exam-
ple of how national issues hid the assumption of a public health obliga-
tion. Echoing Locke, Jay begins his analysis with a discussion of the
reasons why governments are necessary. He writes, "Among the many
objects to which a wise and free people find it necessary to direct their
attention, that of providing for their safety seems to be the first. ' 38 6 He
then goes on to concede that "[t]he safety of the people doubtless has
relation to a great variety of circumstances and considerations, and con-
sequently affords great latitude to those who wish to define it precisely
and comprehensively. ' 387 Discussing all the ways in which governments
must provide for safety, however, is not his goal; instead, he focuses his
discussion on only one form: "the preservation of peace and tranquillity,
as well as against dangers from foreign arms and influence, as from dan-
gers of the like kind arising from domestic causes. ' 388
This form of protection is addressed because it forms the basis for
the federalists' call for increased national strength. Protection from for-
382. NEDELSKY, supra note 268, at 185-86.
383. Carol M. Rose, The Ancient Constitution vs. The Federalist Empire: Anti-Federalism
from the Attack on "Monarchism" to Modern Localism, 84 Nw. U. L. REv. 74, 86-87 (1989);
KRAMNICK, supra note 274, at 265.
384. Rose, supra note 383, at 84. And, of course, the anti-federalists may have proven the
better prophets.
385. Randy E. Barnett, Reconceiving The Ninth Amendment, 74 CORNELL L. RPv. 1, 8
(1988).
386. THE FEDERALIST No. 3, supra note 332, at 42
387. Id.
388. Id.
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eign armies requires greater national strength and unity in foreign deal-
ings. 89 Safety from domestic uprisings also requires national unity
because states that are not unified are either too weak to repel uprisings
(as in the case of Shay's rebellion) 390 or more prone to inevitable conflict
against each other.391 None of this negates the fact that states and local
governments were assumed to have an obligation to protect safety in
other ways, such as by protecting the public health. Jay initially suggests
that there are other protective roles for governments-presumably state
and local governments-to play.392 Those other roles, however, were not
relevant to the question of national unity and, therefore, not very perti-
nent to the debate at hand.393 As Hamilton stated in The Federalist No.
17:
The variety of more minute interests, which will necessarily fall
under the superintendence of the local administrations, and which
will form so many rivulets of influence, running through every part
of the society, cannot be particularized, without involving a detail
too tedious and uninteresting to compensate for the instruction it
might afford.
394
With a new governmental structure to design, there was no need to de-
bate such a timeless and inevitable function as preservation of health.
B. The Framers' Views of Positive Rights
The framing generation's focus on the problems attendant to devel-
oping a national state suggests not only why the constitutional text and
debates are silent about the public health obligation, but also why the
Constitution apparently emphasizes negative rights and limitations on
governmental authority. Today, we often attribute the Constitution's
seeming obsession with limiting authority to the influences of Lockean
individualism.395
Although the constitutional debates were filled with concerns about
limits on governmental authority,3 96 these concerns did not necessarily
stem from a libertarian or radically individualistic assumption about the
389. THE FEDERALIST Nos. 3-5 (John Jay), No. 6 (Alexander Hamilton).
390. THE FEDERALIST No. 6 (Alexander Hamilton).
391. THE FEDERALIST Nos. 6-8 (Alexander Hamilton). Madison's argument in The Fed-
eralist No. 10 can be seen as an extension of this view. Small states may be captured by factions
and are less likely to respect the common peace.
392. THE FEDERALIST No. 3 (John Jay).
393. It was only later, after ratification, that the apparent conflict between protection of
health and national unity in commerce became evident. See Parmet, supra note 5, at 745.
394. THE FEDERALIST No. 17 (Alexander Hamilton).
395. See supra text accompanying notes 273-80.
396. THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison); Rose, supra note 383, at 84.
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relationship between individual and government. The Lockeanism of the
eighteenth century was completely compatible with and even supportive
of an assertion of an affirmative role for the body politic.397 The recipro-
cal relationship between individual and community, however, was not
part of the federal structure. It preceded the federal structure because it
was embedded in the prior social or governmental compact that articu-
lated the relationship and obligations between individuals and their state
or local governments. Thus, if there were reciprocal rights and obliga-
tions between individuals and political authorities, they existed not at the
federal level, but at the more intimate level of the state or the local gov-
ernment.398 The federal constitution was silent about public health and
lends itself to being interpreted as a negative document not because the
Framers meant to alter the practices common in states and towns, but
precisely because the Framers saw the positive obligation to protect the
public health as deriving from a prior contract, which the federal consti-
tution did not displace.
That a Constitution filled with limits upon government was not seen
as a critique of the obligation of states and localities to protect the public
health becomes clearer by reviewing what happened after ratification.
Throughout the 1790s, states expanded their role in protecting the public
health.399 At the same time, the national debate focused on the expan-
sion of national authority, not the existence of state obligations. In op-
posing the passage of a bill to regulate cod fishery in 1792, James
Madison warned against a broad reading of the Constitution's "national
welfare" clause. He stated that if that clause were given a broad mean-
ing, Congress could
take into their own hands the education of children, establishing in
like manner schools throughout the Union; they may assume the
provision for the poor; they may undertake the regulation of all
roads other than post-roads; in short, everything from the highest
object of state legislation down to the most minute object of police,
397. See supra text accompanying notes 315-17, 328-32; Horwitz, supra note 373, at 66-72.
398. The obligation to provide for public education, for example, was explicitly stated in
the Massachusetts constitution of 1787. However, according to Oscar and Mary Handlin, the
provision was controversial, not because people doubted the public obligation to provide for
education, but because they felt that the obligation lay within the province of local communi-
ties rather than state governments. DocuMENTs ON THE MASSACHUSETTS CONSTITUTION,
supra note 312, at 29. Similarly with public health protection, it is not always apparent
whether 18th century Americans saw the primary governmental contract as existing at the
state or local level.
399. See supra text accompanying notes 163-66, 202-17.
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would be thrown under the power of Congress .... "'
The result would be the diminution of the role of the states.
The history of Congress's actions with respect to public health legis-
lation itself sheds further light on how federalism affected the debate." 1
For example, in 1796, with the Philadelphia yellow fever epidemic fresh
in everyone's mind, Congress debated a law authorizing the President to
institute maritime quarantines." 2 The question before Congress was not
whether governments were obligated to protect the public health, but
rather to which jurisdiction, federal or state, the task of regulating ports
fell.4°3 Opponents of the bill objected not to the idea of quarantine, nor
to the assertion of public authority over individual right, but to the ex-
pansion of federal authority. Representative Hester argued that "[m]any
of the States lay very distant from the seat of Government, and before
information could be given to the President of the apprehension of any
pestilence being introduced, and his answer received, the disease might
be introduced into the country, and great havoc made amongst our citi-
zens."'  Representative Sitgreaves disagreed, arguing that:
the strongest and best reason for a law, such as the one proposed,
is, that it is a matter of very serious doubt whether, upon this sub-
ject, the States had any authority at all, and whether all such
power is not vested by the Constitution in the Congress, under
their general authority to regulate commerce and navigation." 5
Representative Gallatin responded that the "regulation of quarantine
had nothing to do with commerce. It was a regulation of internal police.
It was to preserve the health of a certain place, by preventing the intro-
duction of pestilential diseases, by preventing persons coming from coun-
400. Remarks of James Madison in the House of Representatives (Feb. 7, 1792), in 4 THE
DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CON-
STITUTION 429 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 1881).
401. See generally Michael S. Morgenstern, The Role of the Federal Government in Protect-
ing Citizens from Communicable Diseases, 47 U. CIN. L. REV. 537 (1978).
402. BESS FURMAN, A PROFILE OF THE UNITED STATES PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE 1798-
1948, at 10-11 (1973).
403. This problem magnified as the years passed. An early warning came in the "petition
of sundry merchants residing in the City and State of New York" who appealed to Congress to
relieve them of the burdens of New York's quarantine laws. 11 ANNALS OF CONG. 991 (1802).
Justice Marshall provided the first judicial discussion of the issue in Gibbons v. Ogden when he
recognized that state power to protect the public health might at times conflict with and have
to give way to Congressional regulation of commerce. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 235-37 (1824). By
the end of the 19th century, the tension between local police powers and nationalization of
commerce had become a significant problem for constitutional law. E.g., Blewett H. Lee, Lim-
itations Imposed by the Federal Constitution on the Right of the States to Enact Quarantine
Laws, 2 HARV. L. REV. 267 (1889); William H. Cowles, State Quarantine Laws and the Fed-
eral Constitution, 25 AM. U. L. REv. 45 (1891).
404. 5 ANNALS OF CONG. 1347-48 (1796).
405. 5 id. at 1350; see also 5 id, at 1348 (remarks of Rep. Smith).
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tries where they were prevalent."'  He added that "when the
Legislatures of different States had legislated on the subject, they had
thought it an important branch of their duty." 7 Ultimately, a compro-
mise was reached. The section of the bill authorizing the President to
enforce quarantines was stricken4"8 and the bill was enacted giving the
President power to assist states seeking cooperation in the enforcement of
their own quarantine laws. 4 9
Two years later, Congress enacted the Act for the Relief of the Sick
and Disabled Seamen.410 This Act was an early federal social insurance
program, creating a payroll tax for sailors to provide for their medical
care. Opposition to the Act was again primarily predicated on federal-
ism grounds.4 " According to a Representative of Massachusetts, the Act
was unnecessary because "provision is already made for sick and disabled
persons of every description, sailors as well as others, with which every
person in the community is charged.9
412
Thus, the Congress of the 1790s, which included many of the Fram-
ers, maintained the assumption that the obligation to protect health was
a public one. For them, the only constitutional question was which gov-
ernment had the obligation: federal, state, or local?
In focusing on issues related to their experiment in federalism, the
Framers may have led succeeding generations astray as to their inten-
tions. We look to their debates on the structure of the federal govern-
ment, the relationship between the federal government and the states,
and the limitations placed on governmental authority. We see in the
Constitution, particularly after its amendment by the Bill of Rights, the
architecture of government and the rights of individuals against that lim-
ited government. The Constitution and the debates surrounding it ap-
pear on their face to support current conventional assumptions that the
Framers did not believe in public duties. After all, when we look at the
Constitution, we see no mention of governmental obligations and per-
ceive no more than a hint of a social contract creating reciprocal rights
and obligations between individual and community.
We see such a "negative Constitution" not because the eighteenth
century was an age of libertarianism, but because the Constitution we are
406. 5 id. at 1353.
407. Id.
408. 5 id. at 1359.
409. Act of May 27, 1796, ch. 31, 1 Stat. 474.
410. Act of July 16, 1798, ch. 77, 1 Stat. 605.
411. 8 ANNALS OF CONG. 1391 (1798) (remarks of Rep. Varnum).
412. 8 id. at 1386 (remarks of Rep. Sewall). Representative Sewall acknowledged that this
was not always the case in the southern states. Id.
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looking at was never meant to deal with the relationship between individ-
ual and community, nor define or delimit the scope of public authority.
These issues were not addressed in the constitutional debates because
their answers were unchallenged and assumed to be what they had al-
ways been.413 Local governments were assumed to have the authority
and reciprocal obligation to protect the public health and the Constitu-
tion simply did not speak to the issue.
Since 1787, much has happened. In the years following the Consti-
tution's ratification, America industrialized. The mercantilist society
withered as a more laissez faire ideology developed.414 Regulations and
economic protections were repealed.415 The understanding of the social
contract changed. The idea of a public health duty integral to the legiti-
macy of the state may have faded, only to be "rediscovered" through the
sanitary movements of the Progressive Era and eventually the New
Deal.416
The dramatic changes in federal-state relations wrought first by the
Civil War and then by the New Deal complicated our attempt to recall
the framing generation's views about public health. In the post-New
Deal world, we look to the federal government and the federal bureau-
cracy to supply many of the needs that local governments once filled. In
assuming a greater national role in social provision, and in accepting the
incorporation of most provisions of the Bill of Rights into the Fourteenth
Amendment, we are liable to err with Judge Easterbrook in assuming
that the Framers' conception of the role of the national government sup-
plies us with the Framers' views on the nature of governments. 1 We
forget that while the Framers assumed that the national government had
a very limited and quite negative role to play, they also assumed that a
413. Peters's study of the Massachusetts state constitution shows that there was an as-
sumption that the role of government was to better the public good. PETERS, supra note 300,
at 45. Most state documents expressed the common assertion that government must provide
for the protection of life or security without ever amplifying what that meant. See supra text
accompanying notes 328-32.
414. MORTON HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 102 (1977).
415. For example, while the practice of medicine was routinely regulated in the 18th cen-
tury, it was generally deregulated in the early to mid-19th century, only to be re-regulated in
the late 19th century. The problem is that we forget that 20th century regulations of the
Progressive Era were not America's initial acquaintance with activist government. PAUL
STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 102-12 (1982); see also
DANIEL CALLAHAN, WHAT KIND OF LIFE: THE LIMITS OF MEDICAL PROGRESS 193 (1990).
Nor were the provisions of the New Deal our first taste of social provision.
416. It is a common error to assume that government's active involvement with health care
began only in this century, and to forget the far earlier and far deeper obligation. See supra
note 415.
417. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
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very different social contract existed between the individual and body
politic at the local level. At that level, rights were not merely negative,
they were correlated to obligations. Local governments not only had
limits, they also had duties. And among those duties were the care and
protection of those who consented to the government's authority: the
obligation to protect the public's health.
VI. Applying the Framers' Vision Today
A. Barriers to a Right to Protection
What is the significance of the Framers' views about public health?
What do they mean for contemporary constitutional law?
The Framers assumed that governments are obligated under the so-
cial contract to protect the public health and that such protection neces-
sarily includes care to the ill, including the indigent ill. But this
interpretation does not necessarily prove any constitutional right to a
particular form of public health provision today. Nevertheless, the rec-
ognition that the Framers may have seen public health protection as inte-
gral to governmental legitimacy offers significant insights into
contemporary dilemmas.41 In this section, I sketch briefly the hurdles
to converting the framing era's assumptions into a modem constitutional
"right." In Part VI.B, I offer some speculations as to how recognition of
the eighteenth century's assumptions might alter contemporary
discourse.
The first hurdle to converting the eighteenth century's public health
views to modem rights derives from the tenuousness of originalism itself.
Constitutional law today looks very different than it did in 1787. The
Framers' belief that there was a social contract to protect the public
health does not bind us to such a contract today anymore than we are
bound to follow the Framers' views about the establishment of religion or
property qualifications for the franchise.419
418. Present day versions of social contract theory can also be used to articulate some
version of a right to health care. E.g., DANIELS, supra note 357, passim; Dougherty, supra
note 29,passim. It is not my purpose here to develop or critique such philosophical constructs.
Rather, I seek only to discuss how consideration of social contract theory's role in our consti-
tutional tradition can illuminate current legal issues.
419. See James A. Gardner, The Positivist Foundations of Originalism, 71 B.U. L. REV. 1,
1-4 (1991) (surveying arguments as to why constitutional interpretation should not be bound
to the original intention of the Framers); see also Henry P. Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Con-
stitutionalAdjudication, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 723, 727-39 (1988) (showing examples of doctri-
nal departures from original intent); Mark Tushnet, The U.S. Constitution and the Intent of
the Framers, 36 BUFF. L. REv. 217, 218-22 (1987) (discussing difficulties of following original
intent).
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Even if we were compelled to follow the Framers' views, it is not
clear what that would entail. Although a belief in a governmental public
health obligation was wide spread in the eighteenth century, the Framers
had little reason to focus upon what that obligation meant in precise
terms. Just what protections the government was obligated to provide
and how they were to be implemented was not answered by social con-
tract theory, nor were these questions posed in the debate over federal-
ism. Although public health regulations in contemporary America are
woefully deficient in many ways, especially with respect to the lack of
universal access to health care, and prevention of communicable diseases
such as AIDS and tuberculosis, they are far more complex than anything
that could have been imagined two centuries ago.420 Just which of to-
day's measures would have been seen as necessary to the fulfillment of
the social compact by a generation that could never envision such issues
is surely unanswerable.
This uncertainty points to a second hurdle: the changing nature of
rights. Although the public health obligation was likely seen by the
framing generation as part of the social or governmental contract, 421 it
was not necessarily conceived of as a "right" in the way we use the word.
As noted above, it was more likely seen as a political, natural right ema-
nating from the social contract and integral to constitutional legitimacy.
It was not necessarily a judicially enforceable, adjudicative right.
By contrast, today we rarely speak of political rights apart from ad-
judicative rights. We assume that legal rights are definite, objectively
ascertainable, and capable of judicial enforcement.422 Rights that lack
such capacities cannot be "rights" at all. As many have pointed out,
obligations upon government, or positive rights, rarely take on this char-
acter.423 Positive rights are seldom easily enforceable by courts, except
perhaps where government has already acted, thereby opening its per-
formance up to scrutiny.424 The difficulties of envisioning or even enforc-
ing a judge-declared "right to health care" in the absence of statutory law
seem insurmountable to the point of making the very idea of such a
420. For a discussion of the inadequacies of our current prevention program, see UNITED
HOSPITAL FUND, supra note 34, at 6. Despite these failings, no 18th century program can
begin to compare to modem programs such as Medicare in terms of complexity.
421. See supra text accompanying notes 337-65. For example, no 18th century program
can begin to compare to Medicare in terms of complexity.
422. Michelman, Possession vi Distribution, supra note 268, at 1321.
423. Id.; see also CHARLES FRIED, RIGHT AND WRONG 110-14 (1978); Charles L. Black,
Further Reflections on the Constitutional Justice of Livelihood, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 1103, 1111-
12 (1986); Frank I. MichelIman, Welfare Rights in a Constitutional Democracy, 1979 WASH. U.
L.Q. 659, 663.
424. Michelman, supra note 423, at 663.
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"right" appear absurd.425
The third barrier to applying the eighteenth century's understanding
of the public health obligation to the creation of any contemporary con-
stitutional rights is federalism. If the Framers believed that the obligation
to protect the public health was part of the social contract and funda-
mental to the relationship between individual and body politic, they did
not believe that it was relevant to the relationship between individuals
and the newly formed federal government.426 Rather, the obligation lay
at some prior, undefined level, perhaps as part of the civil contract or as
part of the governmental contract forming state or local entities.427
Thus, the intentions of the Framers alone cannot be used in a single step
to justify a federal obligation to protect health.
Nor can the views of 1787 easily support a theory requiring states to
provide such protection. It is not clear that the Framers actually saw the
obligation as one resting with the states, as opposed to more local or less
formal political entities.428 More importantly, even if they did believe
that the obligation rested with the states,429 the Framers certainly did not
believe that the Constitution of 1787 significantly altered or guaranteed
the relationship between individuals and states.430 Duties owed by the
states to their citizens were owed as part of the social contract, not as
part of a federal constitutional guarantee.431
Soon after the Constitution was enacted, the relevance of the rela-
tionship between individuals and states to constitutional law became ap-
parent. In delineating the respective jurisdictions of the federal and state
governments, the courts necessarily had to consider the nature of proper
state functions.432 Moreover, the enactment of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment provided a richer constitutional dimension to the relationship be-
425. See Brown, Parmet, & Baumann, supra note 30, at 622-23 (1987).
426. See supra text accompanying notes 397-413.
427. See supra text accompanying notes 380-94.
428. See supra text accompanying note 398.
429. This view has much merit given the extensive colonial and state legislation enacted to
protect the public health. See supra part III.A-B.
430. See THE FEDERALIST No. 45 (James Madison) (explaining how the states will retain
most of their authority and the primary loyalty of the people.)
431. Of course, the original Constitution of 1787 did provide a few limited rights against
states. The Ninth Amendment can be read as assuming that others existed. See Barnett, supra
note 385, at 36. The Tenth Amendment also ensured that states retained powers not given to
the newly created federal authority. Just what obligations states were expected to fulfill using
that authority was never spelled out by the Framers. Nor did it have to be, because it was
widely assumed to be known and, in any event, irrelevant to the framing of the federal
constitution.
432. See Parmet, supra note 5, at 744.
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tween states and their own citizens. 33 With the incorporation of many
of the provisions of the Bill of Rights into the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, we now readily assume that the fundamental
law governing the individual's relationship to the federal government is
almost identical to the law governing the individual's relationship to state
governments.434 But that parity leaves a hole: what about the obliga-
tions that in 1787 were assumed to belong to the states as a matter of
fundamental law, but not federal constitutional law? By applying the
Framers' assumptions about the federal government to state obligations,
as incorporation teaches us to do, we overlook the earlier understanding
of what constitutes the contract between local governments and
individuals.435
One solution would be to read the Fourteenth Amendment as pro-
viding a federal guarantee of the framing era's understanding of the rela-
tionship between local governments and individuals, rather than merely
using the Fourteenth Amendment to apply federal norms to local rela-
tionships to the states. To do that and stay within an originalist para-
digm, we would also need to ask what were the assumptions of 1868
when the Fourteenth Amendment was enacted. It is not at all clear that
433. Exparte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 344-48 (1879).
434. For example, the federal abortion cases make no distinction between the right of pri-
vacy against the federal government and the right of privacy against state governments. Com-
pare Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) with Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977). The
recent trend by state courts to interpret their own constitutions differently, see Daan
Braveman, Children, Poverty, and State Constitutions, 38 EMORY L.J. 577, 578 (1989); Adam
S. Cohen, More Myths of Parity, State Court Forums and Constitutional Actions for the Right to
Shelter, 38 EMORY L.J. 615, 621-25 (1989), suggests that the simple equation between federal
and state rights might be withering away.
435. One potential solution is to see these issues not primarily as matters of federal law, but
as questions of state constitutional law. Under this view, the public health obligation might
fall under the state constitutional doctrines. Indeed, to some extent, state courts have been
moving in this direction, finding obligations on the part of states, particularly in the area of
education, which the federal courts have not found within the federal constitution. See
Hirshman, supra note 273, at 1020. Even in the area of health care, many state courts have
disagreed with the Supreme Court's decisions on Medicaid funding of abortion. See Brown,
Parmet, & Baumann, supra note 30, at 637 n.397. The problem, however, is that today it is
difficult, if not impossible, for states to protect public health by themselves precisely because of
federalism doctrines, which have allowed the federal government to preempt much of the area.
See Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461;
Metropolitan Life Insur. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724 (1985) (analyzing ERISA pre-
emption of state laws mandating health insurance benefits); United Wire, Metal & Mach.
Health & Welfare Fund v. Morristown Memorial Hosp., 793 F. Supp. 524 (D.N.J.), app.
pend'g, No. 92-5312 (3d Cir. 1992); Wendy E. Parmet, Regulation & Federalism: Legal Im-
pediments to State Health Care Reform, AM. J.L. & MED. (forthcoming 1993); Deborah Stone,
Why the States Can't Solve the Health Care Crisis, AM. PROSPECT, Spring 1992, at 51, 55-58.
The irony is, thus, that the federal government has limited the states' ability to fulfill the social
contract without taking on that obligation itself.
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by the 1860s the public health obligation remained intact. The early part
of the nineteenth century saw significant deregulation of health care.436
The Fourteenth Amendment was enacted during the industrial revolu-
tion, when understandings about the role of government and the relation-
ship between individual and society had changed greatly.437 The
Framers' understanding of the social contract was not necessarily shared
by either citizens or politicians in 1868.438
Thus there are many steps, some of them missing, between the argu-
ment that public health protection was assumed by social contract theory
in 1787 and the argument that there is today an enforceable right to
health care. That does not mean that the eighteenth century's under-
standings are of no practical import. In the final section, I suggest briefly
how the social contract theory of public health care can alter our current
debates.
B. Recognizing the Public Health Obligation Today
Recognition of the Framers' views about the public health obliga-
tion casts into question the conventional assumptions that underpin con-
stitutional health law. Much of contemporary constitutional law is
predicated on the constitutional tradition of laissez fake, providing only
negative rights.4 39 Existing doctrine presupposes that the starting point
or baseline of analysis is that government has no obligations at all. Con-
stitutional rights are predominantly negative: limiting the scope of gov-
ernmental authority and preserving individual freedom.' 0
An examination of the public health activities and social contract
theories of the eighteenth century casts doubt on the historical accuracy
of those assumptions. It demonstrates that while laissez faire may or
may not be an appropriate ideal, it was not our nation's historical start-
ing point. Contrary to the perceived history, active government did not
emerge for the first time during the Progressive and New Deal eras. In
the area of public health, government was highly active long before the
framing of the Constitution. The public health status quo of 1787 was a
regulatory one, supported by the prevailing political theories and even by
436. See supra text accompanying notes 414-16.
437. I have previously discussed in detail how some of the changes in the latter part of the
19th century altered the courts' understanding of the police power. Parmet, supra note 5, at
748-52.
438. This is not to say that by 1868 the government was assumed to have no obligation to
secure the public health. The point is that the obligations understood in 1868 may have dif-
fered from those assumed in 1787.
439. See supra notes 23-30 and accompanying text.
440. See supra text accompanying notes 11-42.
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the early liberalism of the era. The age of laissez faire came later, if at
all.
Consideration of the framing generation's views about public health
law does more than call into question the starting point of contemporary
case law.4" It also provides a counter-tradition from which to draw.2
In contrast to a jurisprudence that sees individual freedom from govern-
ment as the highest value, it offers the fundamental insight of social con-
tract and public health theory: the state of nature is not a safe or healthy
place. Both Lockean individualists and civic republicans can agree that
individual lives and health are forever insecure. Only when human be-
ings work together and protect one another can any modest security be
found.
For the Framers, recognition of the precariousness of human health
did not imply total submission to state authority." 3 Governments were
necessary and rights had to be subsumed, but only in exchange for pro-
tections to be afforded. 4 " Thus, rights were not purely negative: they
were dependent upon reciprocal obligations.
While this vision of the interdependence of rights and obligations
might not compel the existence of a judicially enforceable constitutional
right to health care," 5 we can still imagine it as part of our social con-
tract-as an obligation inextricably connected to our understanding of
public authority and individual rights." 6 If, with the Framers, we recog-
nized that governments have authority because they have obligations,
then their fulfillment of those obligations to further the common good
and to protect the public health could well be seen as part of the political
measure by which we as a society judge the legitimacy of our laws.'
441. See, e.g., Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct 1759 (1991); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297
(1980).
442. See, eg., West, supra note 49, at 123-24 (observing that examination of constitutional
history may offer insight into "imaginings more worthy than our own," even if it provides no
determinative answer to contemporary issues).
443. The Framers never accepted the idea of unlimited government. See, eg., THE FEDER-
ALIST No. 51 (James Madison).
444. See supra text accompanying notes 328-32.
445. See supra text accompanying notes 418-38. For an attempt to use social-contract the-
ory to develop an ethical, as opposed to constitutional, right to health care, see DANIELS, supra
note 357, passim.
446. Cf Sen, supra note 62, at 50 ("The social commitment to individual freedom has to be
concerned with both positive and negative freedoms.").
447. Peters, for example, says that as far as individual rights are concerned, social contract
theory ultimately erodes to a proceduralist theory, under which majoritarian laws are assumed
to be in the public good. He goes on to argue that there remains, nonetheless, a social under-
standing of the public good, against which laws in general, even majoritarian ones, can be
tested. PETERS, supra note 290, at 179. This view would suggest that while a particular indi-
vidual may not claim a right to protection greater than that which the legislature has chosen to
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While this view may not translate easily into the language of constitu-
tional doctrine,448 a recognition, even if not judicially enforceable, that
public health protection is obligatory, fundamental, and related to the
legitimacy of governmental authority would carry political debate and
constitutional jurisprudence far from the language of privileges, gratui-
ties, and policies that characterize contemporary discussion of public
health law.
Moreover, such a change in discourse has a more concrete doctrinal
impact than is at first evident.' 9 Consider the paradigmatic constitu-
tional law public health case, in which the government proposes to inter-
fere with individual freedom by criminalizing abortions or detaining
tuberculosis patients who fail to take their medication.450 In such nega-
tive rights cases, which would likely be debated under the rubric of pri-
vacy or procedural due process, the critical question is whether the
individual has a negative right limiting the government's actions.451 For
much of this century, the answer lay in the importance and nature of the
individual interest.452 Thus, in Roe v. Wade, the Court found that a wo-
man had a privacy interest in having an abortion only after stressing the
significance of the interest to the woman.453 This approach was recently
confirmed in Casey.454 Privacy analysis celebrates the individual's free-
provide, society as a whole retains the right under natural law to test the legitimacy of the
legislature's actions to see if they fulfill the government contract obligation to protect the pub-
lic good.
448. A non-legal approach might be to use social contract paradigms to determine the
content of the obligations. Rawls, of course, is the most important modem day social contract
theorist. RAWLS, supra note 60. He attempts to develop a social contract theory by asking
what individuals placed behind a veil of ignorance would see as just. DANIELS, supra note 357,
and Dougherty, supra note 29, apply Rawlsian logic to the health care context. Here, in con-
trast, I seek only to apply our far more general constitutional understanding of social contract
theory to constitutional interpretation. I do not intend to develop a position as to what a
"true" or "just" abstract social contract would entail with respect to health care.
449. I hope to explore the modem applications of the public health view more fully in a
later piece.
450. E.g., Greene v. Edwards, 263 S.E.2d 661 (W. Va. 1920); Moore v. Draper, 57 So. 2d
648 (Fla. 1952); UNITED HOSPITAL FUND, supra note 34, at 25-26.
45 1. This was not always the case. Earlier in the century, the key question was whether the
government's action fell within the proper parameters of the police power. See Parmet, supra
note 5, at 744. Today, the question of governmental purpose has become subsumed by the
balancing of medical reasonableness against the individual's interest. See Burris, supra note 8,
at 978.
452. See, e.g., Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2807-08 (joint opinion of Justices O'Connor, Kennedy,
and Souter); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
453. Roe, 410 U.S. at 142-54. The Court also considered whether a fetus was a person and
then, deciding it was not for constitutional purposes, analyzed the nature of the state's remain-
ing interests. Id. at 158, 162.
454. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2808.
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dom or autonomy.455 The power of government to restrain that auton-
omy is limited by law.
In recent years, the Supreme Court has moved away from vigilant
protection of individual interests. Questioning both the scope and the
existence of "non-textual" rights, some justices have increasingly af-
firmed acts of government, regardless of their impact on individual
interests.456
What the current approach has in common with its predecessor is
the assumption that individual rights are distinct from governmental
duties. Both approaches are predicated on the assumption that govern-
ment has no obligation, that individual rights are only negative ones
against government, and that the question is whether the negative right
trumps the governmental power. Taken abstractly, both sides look
unappealing.457
A public health view would change the assumptions and analysis.
Under such a vision, the government's right to interfere with the individ-
ual's freedom could not be divorced from its obligation to care for and
protect her. The strength and importance of the governmental purpose,
as well as the ways in which the individual was receiving care and protec-
tion, would become an integral part of the analysis. Thus, in an abortion
case, the question of whether a woman has a right to have an abortion
would invariably depend not only upon whether the state has the right to
infringe upon her liberty, but also upon whether the state was fulfilling
its obligations to her.4 58 Similarly, in a case concerning whether the state
can detain a tuberculosis patient who failed to take her medications, 459
the court would look not only at the infringement of individual liberty,
455. On the individualism of Roe, see Parmet, supra note 5, at 759. See also William
Mathie, Reason, Revelation, and Liberal Justice: Reflections on George Grant's Analysis of Roe
v. Wade, 19 CANADA J. POL. Sci. 443, 444 (1986).
456. See, e.g., Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2859-60 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting in part and concur-
ring in part); Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989) (Scalia, J., plurality opinion);
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
457. Thus, polls suggest that the majority of Americans favor neither unconditional rights
to abortion, nor strict regulation of it. They may see abortion as an evil, but one which women
should be free to choose, given harsh circumstances. KRISTIN LUKER, ABORTION AND THE
POLITICS OF MOTHERHOOD 224-28 (1984).
458. Ruth Colker has argued that abortion is an especially important right in a society in
which there is little provision for contraception, pre-natal care, or child health care. Ruth
Colker, Abortion & Dialogue, 63 TUL. L. REv. 1363, 1380 (1989). Mary Ann Glendon has
also pointed out how differently abortion regulations appear in the European context, where
nations provide greater maternity and child-care services than do American states. MARY
ANN GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN WESTERN LAW 17, 20, 53-57 (1987).
459. See supra note 450.
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but also whether the state has met its responsibilities to her and the com-
munity to assure the provision of medicine and the protection of health.
This introduction of social contract ideas can radically alter the
jurisprudence of public health. It could force a consideration of the ways
in which our states provide or fail to provide for the care and protection
of those vulnerable to ill health. It could suggest that even if individuals
have no absolute, positive constitutional "rights" to health care, govern-
ment still cannot restrain their liberties without fulfilling its obligation to
provide care.
A public health view can also alter the analysis of unconstitutional
conditions cases. 4" ° At first, these cases in which the government re-
stricts freedom in return for the provision of a benefit would appear to
follow social contract theory. In fact, however, the current cases retain
only the form and not the understandings of the public health view.
Consider Rust v. Sullivan,461 in which the Supreme Court affirmed
that clinics receiving federal family planning grants can be barred from
providing abortion counseling. The Court suggested that the denial of
the right to speak freely about abortion followed from the fact that the
government did not have to subsidize the clinic at all. In effect, the gov-
ernment was giving the clinic a gratuity which might be conditioned
upon the forfeiture of First Amendment rights.462 Under a public health
view that basic assumption would have to be challenged. The starting
point for the analysis would not be a state of nature in which a laissez
faire government has no obligations. Instead, the starting point would be
the contract under which government is fundamentally obligated to pro-
tect the public health. Under this analysis, the patients of the clinic
would have a prior right, even if not judicially enforceable, to receive
some care and protection; this right derives from the governmental con-
tract, not from the government's decision to subsidize the clinic.
Using the public health view radically changes the constitutional fo-
cus. Rather than seeing the individual as having no rights prior to the
exchange of protected speech for care, a court would have to consider the
restriction on speech in light of a baseline understanding in which the
individual has some prior rights to care grounded in an obligation critical
to the legitimacy of the government.
This analysis does not guarantee that the clinic would win. The
question would remain whether the provision of Title X services was part
of the public health obligation-a question for which there is no clear
460. See supra text accompanying notes 36-41.
461. 111 S. Ct. at 1759.
462. See supra text accompanying notes 37-41.
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and obvious answer. Moreover, the validity of the abridgement of free
speech would have to be considered. Was it part of the initial surrender
of rights undertaken to form the social contract? Is the case like that of
shouting "fire" in the proverbial crowded theater, in which there is no
longer any freedom because the public's safety must be protected? Or, is
this a case, as the language in Rust seems to concede, in which speech
would be protected in the absence of any federal subsidy? If so, then
under a public health view, it appears that government is upping the ante
on the social contract. It is extracting sacrifice of an extra liberty-free-
dom of speech-as a quid pro quo for providing that which society al-
ready owes.
In offering this answer, I do not contend that it is the only one, nor
that any particular outcome inevitably follows from the public health
view. I wish only to suggest that the recognition of a social obligation to
protect public health is fundamental to the legitimacy of governmental
authority and must change the analysis and alter the way we think about
public health law and the relationship between individuals and the state.
This view forces us to see that rights are connected to duties and that the
surrender of rights is not a price paid for discretionary benefits bestowed,
but part of a far more fundamental understanding of the legitimation of
governmental authority itself.
Ultimately, an understanding of the public health vision casts light
not only on health care cases, but on constitutional law itself. Cases
about abortion, the right to die, and AIDS weigh heavily in constitu-
tional debate not only because they are poignant, but because they are
about the relationship between individual and state in the face of threats
to life and health. They bring into sharp focus the very reasons for hav-
ing governments and law: to care for and protect each other, as best we
can, without intruding too gravely upon the autonomy of each. By for-
getting what the framing generation understood-that our own health is
ultimately dependent on the care we give each other-we threaten the
legitimacy of the state, and, in the final analysis, of our laws.

